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1AbstrAct
You have just decided to sit down and read this abstract; perhaps, at the end of it, you’ll decide 
to continue and read this whole thesis. Your ability to freely make that choice is simple enough, 
right? Or is the feeling of free willed choice an illusion? Metaphysicians, moral philosophers, 
psychologists, and neuroscientists are among the many who have weighed in on this question, 
offering a complicated variety of answers. Little work has been done to synthesize these 
approaches. My thesis is an attempt at a synthesis, showing that these perspectives can be 
reconciled by incorporating ideas from practical reasoning and recent neuroscience. Here, I 
review prominent philosophical and scientific work on free will, and offer my own proposal. 
My model of free will suggests that neurological activity can orchestrate indeterministic and 
deterministic events such that our conscious thought can generate and select novel criteria for 
neural activity. This resculpts neural pathways, influencing the channels through which future 
decision-making flows. I argue that this is tantamount to having a capacity for self-generating 
motivations, which allows both free and conscious choice in the moment, as well as free and 
unconscious choice in the future. Because the sculpting of neural activity and networks forces 
some unconscious activity to flow through channels of decision-making that we have already 
consciously endorsed, I argue that we are responsible for some of our unconscious decisions 
as well as conscious ones. Future empirical work can determine the extent to which conscious 
control can affect change in the brain, and to what extent unconscious activity conforms to neural 
sculpting. This, in turn, will give us greater insight into consequences tied up in our freedom of 
will: our moral responsibility, legal responsibility, and personal identity.
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3IntroductIon to free wIll
Science investigates how things work. Discoveries in the biological sciences provide 
biological explanations for natural phenomena, such as ecological interactions, cellular activity, 
or animal behavior. When neuroscience or cognitive psychology provide a biological explanation 
for the occurrence of a human behavior, it seems to subtract from the strength of our seemingly 
inexplicable free will to choose our own behavior. Much like how the actual role of gods 
in bringing about phenomena in the world are pushed further and further back by scientific 
explanations, the role of conscious free will, without a biological explanation of its own, is 
similarly reduced as a somehow supernatural force with smaller and smaller domain. Millennia 
ago, before we understood that the sun rises and sets because of rotations of the earth on its orbit 
around this ball of fiery matter, we attributed the movement of this celestial body to the flaming 
chariot of Apollo as he crossed the firmament. When relating this trend to human behavior, 
the issue becomes further complicated because it’s no longer just a question about whether we 
can chock up the activities of the sun to deities or physical laws. When humans are involved, it 
introduces a new variable; now an explanation can be biological, supernatural, or human based. 
A huge question is: is a human explanation equivalent to a biological explanation, and in what 
way?
Before we understood such disorders as autism, major anxiety disorder, or depression 
(not that we really understand them today), we thought that behaviors of autistic, anxious, 
or depressed individuals were indicative of moral depravity, demonic possession, or divine 
punishment. The first explanation appears heinous in the modern day because it places blame 
4squarely on the shoulders of the individual for things which we understand now to be outside of 
their control. The latter two explanations seem to be mislead because they place the blame on 
supernatural phenomena when today we have at least some of the necessary research to suspect 
an entirely biological explanation. For some behaviors, such as the poor recognition of social 
cues by autistic individuals, it seems unfair to blame the individual, and reasonable to provide a 
biological explanation as an excuse. For other behaviors, like the choice to drive or walk to the 
store, it would seem fair to blame the individual for their choice, and invasive to chock it up to 
some series of biological phenomena.
When we enter the realm of scientific explanation, everything seems to come down to 
deterministic causality, where every event has its directly related, antecedent cause, and that 
the interaction between an event and its cause can be explained by a more or less complicated 
physical law. When it comes to human behavior, there seems to be a range of behaviors to 
which we can accept applying scientific explanations. How we define this range is often 
unclear, and varied widely based on personal belief and across cultures. Some people have no 
problem blaming someone with Asperger’s for a selfish behavior, for example, while others 
are comfortable excusing it on the basis of the disorder. This waffling has severe implications 
for moral theories of responsibility. Does someone with Asperger’s have enough control over 
their behavior in such a way that we can definitively say that they could have chosen a different 
behavior? If they did have control, then they should be considered responsible for their decision. 
If they are responsible, then they can be considered moral or immoral on the basis of whatever 
moral or ethical code we are using to judge.
How can we better define this vague sense of blameworthiness in the face of continuing 
scientific discovery that explains more and more behaviors? Does the discovery that alcoholism, 
for example, is attributable to genetic predisposition mean that alcoholics cannot be blamed 
for their choices? Of course not, they are morally reprehensible for their poor decision to drink 
excessively and irresponsibly, and likewise, they are morally valiant for their choice to overcome 
themselves and quit. At least, this is the case for some. It seems equally naive or ignorant to 
5blame all alcoholics for their behavior as it does to blame none of them. The catch is that not 
all alcoholics are equally predisposed by their genetics. There are different genetic causes, and 
magnitudes of cause for such behavior, which indicates that some people have less control than 
others. In order to assign moral responsibility, we need more information. We need to know the 
precise genetic background of the individual, and more research is needed to determine which 
genetic causes can be controlled and which cannot. As such, scientific research can provide 
support for a moral framework. On the other hand, how do we determine if some genetic 
component of our behavior is ‘controllable’? What does control mean?
This is where free will comes into play, and where a cooperative project between 
philosophy and science can produce new criteria for free willing control that calibrates our 
empirical, genetic studies, and that informs our moral framework of which alcoholics are 
responsible and which are not. Note that alcoholism is not the only problem that these criteria 
can clarify, similar paths toward a solution can be achieved with other behaviors that are tracked 
down to genetic predispositions, such as smoking, gambling, and doping. Furthermore, these 
solutions are applicable to other forms of behavioral predisposition such as problems with 
temperament as a result of upbringing, environmental, or social ques.
Can we blame someone raised in an abusive household for violent anger, for example, 
later in life? It certainly wouldn’t seem fair or accurate. More and more research points 
to the destructive and robust effects of traumatic and non-traumatic stress on the physical 
makeup of our brains, which would thus change how we respond to some stimuli, sometimes 
irrevocably. For someone who has been broken down until they no longer have control over 
some decision-making skills, then they cannot be blamed for their behavior, as they have no 
alternative available to them that they can access. Empirical research can tell us more about 
what degree of trauma is required to create such an ingrained change in the brain, what degree 
of trauma someone can recover from, and whether a behavior is driven by a controllable or an 
uncontrollable pattern of activity in the brain, and therefore whether the behavior is freely willed 
or not. These are, of course, advances that will take decades to uncover and optimize for practical 
6application, but having a model and a way forward is an important step toward such discoveries.
As I have shown here, sometimes science comes across as being in opposition to the 
existence of free will. Science is largely in the business of exploring the deterministic, causal 
relations in the world, whereas free will and consciousness seem to be concepts that may not 
be described by deterministic laws of nature (as we understand them currently). Some findings 
of neuroscience and cognitive psychology point to the idea that consciousness is ‘just’ the 
awareness of neural activity in the brain, activity that is unconsciously doing all the work of 
decision-making. There are three central responses to these claims: (1) compatibilists who 
respond that free will is compatible with determinism, even if it is true that consciousness is not 
causally involved; (2) eliminative incompatibilists who hold that free will cannot be compatible 
with a deterministic system, and that since science has described the universe deterministically, 
that free will is an illusion; (3) libertarian incompatibilists, who agree that free will is not 
compatible with determinism, but who also hold that there is indeterminism in the universe, 
which provides sufficient criteria for free will to exist.
In opposition to the first group, I will hold that determinism does exclude free will. In 
opposition to the second group, I hold that the success of quantum mechanics and the importance 
of noise in neural activity shows that we are neither saddled with determinism, nor a lack of 
opportunity for free will. My position aligns most with the third perspective, my only issue being 
that many Libertarians hold that the tiniest proof of indeterminism in the brain can pave the 
way for free will; I suggest that there is evidence for more than a tiny amount of indeterminism, 
and that free will extends beyond the domain of indeterminism. I hold that a mixture of 
indeterminism and determinism is at work in the brain in such a way that consciousness 
wields control over indeterministic neural noise and that through neuroplasticity mechanisms, 
consciousness molds neural networks, thereby shaping future activity. I suggest that a great deal 
of deterministic, unconscious neural activity operates within networks that have been molded by 
consciousness and can be considered an extension of conscious choices. As such, this establishes 
the possibility of free will during both conscious and unconscious decision-making.
7I propose a two stage model of free will during decision-making that can be understood 
in terms of neuroscience or practical reasoning. The scientific version of my model shows that, 
in the first stage, indeterminism creates noise in neural activity, which provides a series of neural 
activity patterns that are available for selection by the agent’s consciousness. When a pattern 
is satisfactorily favored by the agent through the direction of endogenous attention, the pattern 
molds networks in the brain through neuroplasticity mechanisms. Finally, activity that flows 
through this new framework deterministically recruits pre-motor areas and thereby precipitates 
action. This process can also be understood in more intuitive terms of practical reasoning. First, 
we generate a series of motivations, which are reasons to be or act a certain way. Through 
deliberation, we weigh the normative quality of these motivations to ascertain which best fits 
our practical identity and which is the most genuinely moving to us. Once we have selected a 
normative motivation, this acts as an unbreakable law for us, as we must uphold a law that we 
hold ourselves to (if we are genuinely motivated by this reason, then there is no way for us not to 
uphold it, because we are rational we must be a law unto ourselves), and we act on the basis of 
that reason.
In the chapters that follow, I will be outlining some contemporary perspectives on free 
will, proposing a model of free will that hybridizes Libertarianism and concepts from Practical 
Reasoning, and introducing contemporary neuroscience that supports my model. The goal of 
my first chapter is to set the scene. I will showing how philosophies of free will have been 
influenced by scientific discovery, and how, in some cases, a contemporary scientific worldview 
seems to conflict with a belief in free will. In this chapter I will focus specifically on three 
perspectives that represent the three main camps I discussed earlier: compatibilism, eliminitive 
incompatibilism, and Libertarianism. In my second chapter, my proposal will combine 
philosophies of free will and practical reasoning to defend a definition of free will as self-
generated motivation. I will unpack my model at the philosophical level in the second chapter, 
while in the third chapter my goal is to stress the ways in which contemporary neuroscience can 
support my proposal. Together, this thesis aims to put forward a philosophy of free will that is 
8agreeable to some currently opposing perspectives, and that can be flushed out through empirical 
study. With hope, I can show that empirical verification can be reconciled with the seemingly 
non-empirical aspects of free will, such as responsibility, freedom, and identity.
I acknowledge the magnitude of this project, and I do not claim that this thesis provides 
a definitive, comprehensive account single handedly. I do not believe that this thesis even 
comes close to sufficiently substantiating a majority of the intricate or the overarching features 
of free will, neuroscience, and responsibility. My practical goal is to combine subsets of 
different disciplines from philosophy of mind to practical reasoning, from cellular to systems 
neuroscience, and in the end I hope to provide an empirically supported, but falsifiable model of 
free will. This model could reorient philosophy and science toward a more unified goal in their 
respective explorations of free will. In my conclusion I will attempt to briefly demonstrate the 
real world applications of this model.
It will become clear in my conclusory chapter that realizing the application of this model 
will require a joint effort of both science and philosophy, two disciplines which I consider 
prerequisites of each other. My scientific discussion will be carefully mediated by philosophical 
analysis, which I believe can, and should be, a guiding torch for science as much as science can 
and should be a guiding torch for philosophy. I believe that this approach will establish where we 
are and where we need to go. I believe we will come to discover how far away we truly are from 
answering this question empirically, though we can also be encouraged in this pursuit by having 
a clearer path ahead of us.
9chApter 1
free wIll As AbIlIty, lIberty, And IllusIon
Life is like a game of cards. The hand you are dealt is determinism; the way you play it is free will.
~Jawaharlal Nehru
In this chapter, I will briefly sketch some central philosophical positions on free will 
from both philosophers and scientists. As there are so many perspectives, I will have to truncate 
my review and focus on a couple positions that will represent clusters of divided views. After 
describing each in depth, I will also cite the concerns I have about them. The result will be a set 
of problems that any theory should address. In Chapter 2, I will address those problems when I 
lay out my position.
The first major division among the perspectives I will describe is the split between 
determinism and indeterminism. This division involves a discussion of the fundamental structure 
of the universe in which we live. Determinism holds that the laws of nature are determinately 
causal, which is to say that all phenomena occur through a set physical framework, a system of 
cause and effect wherein every result is directly caused by an antecedent event. For example, 
the result of bowling pins getting knocked over is caused by the bowling ball hitting them. 
Indeterminism posits that there are crucial components of the world that exist outside of regular 
causality, either in being probabilistic, or in being epiphenomenal, and can alter the ways in 
which the deterministic pathway proceeds. Probabilistic causality is a theory of causality wherein 
the event (the bowling ball hitting the pins) does not necessarily cause the result (the pins falling 
over). Rather, the bowling ball is influencing the probability that the pins will fall over, but does 
not determine it. Determinism as an idea is ancient, but it gained traction with the expansion 
of scientific and mathematical investigation in the eighteenth century, which clarified facts and 
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laws in the natural world. In contrast, even more recent scientific discoveries have resulted 
in the success of theories of uncertainty and quantum indeterminacy. These have provided 
indeterminism with the claim that determinism cannot take into account the inherent probabilistic 
nature of sub-atomic motion.
Now, to frame indeterminism in the context of free will. Indeterminism as a position 
posits that free will is not compatible with a strictly deterministic causal state of nature (bowling 
ball directly and necessarily causes the pins to fall). Further, some arguments for indeterminism 
hold that there is no reason to believe the inherent state of nature is deterministically causal. 
Panpsychism combines elements of determinism and indeterminism to suggest that free will 
cannot emerge in a purely deterministic world, not even from complex systems, as this would 
require a miracle. Galen Strawson argues from the position of panpsychism that free will does 
exist, and suggests that “all physical stuff is energy, in one form or another, and all energy, I trow, 
is an experience-involving phenomenon (Strawson, 2006; 18). This is to say that the individual 
components of complex systems that build free willing agents all possess in their natures aspects 
of consciousness whereby their combination can render consciousness and therefore free will.
Libertarianism is an indeterminist position largely pioneered by Robert Kane, who states 
that “there must be times at which the agents are able to choose in more than one way, and to 
do so voluntarily, intentionally and rationally, either way they choose” (Kane, 2014; 56) The 
libertarian proposal is that free will is an independent source of causality with which we make, 
what Kane calls self-forming actions in the face of multiple options. 
Determinists fall, primarily, into one of two umbrella camps: Compatibilists and 
Incompatibilists. Compatibilists claim that the existence of free will is compatible with, indeed, 
some claim it requires, the deterministic causal nature of the world. Incompatibilists, on the 
other hand, hold that the nature of a truly free will cannot exist in such a causal realm. Among 
the compatibilists are Dennett, and Velleman, who suggest that consciousness and free will 
are constant narratives in the existence of our bodies, and McKenna, who holds a naturalist 
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perspective and rejects some of the assumptions that libertarians propose are required for the 
existence of a freely willed decision.
Incompatibilists hold that free will is not compatible with a deterministic natural world, 
but do not make the additional claim that free will exists in the way we feel it does. The scramble 
over deciding whether free will is or is not compatible with determinism has been largely pushed 
to the fore by the advancement of modern psychology and neuroscience that has cast what seems 
to be a discouraging light on the issue. With neuroscientists such as Libet and Haggard, the issue 
became how free will can exist if it is clear that consciousness is merely the result, and not the 
direct cause, of activity in the brain.
In his famous experiments, Libet tested the timing of brain activity and conscious 
awareness proceeding a decision and subsequent action (Libet, 1983). Libet was initially inspired 
by the presence of brain activity relevant to the action well before (over 500 ms) the motor 
network executed the action. In his experiment, neural activity was recorded in subjects who 
were told to perform a simple motor action (flexing their wrist) spontaneously. He found that 
neural activity in the motor and pre-motor cortex, readiness potentials, occurred approximately 
800 ms before the action was executed, whereas the subjects’ awareness of the intention to 
move, which they reported through positioning of a clock hand, occurred about 400 ms before 
the action. Thus, prerequisite neural activity preceded conscious awareness, a finding that Libet 
refrained from describing as a blow to free will until later (Libet, 1999), when many who read 
his work interpreted it as the death of free will.
Many oppose the idea that these experiments annul free will. On numerous occasions 
Alfred Mele has rejected their relevance, claiming that they do not invoke moralistic action or 
intention and therefore only comment on the conscious awareness of reflexive action (Mele, 
2009; Ch.7). In essence, he claims that experiments trying to pry apart the topic of free will can 
only claim that the overt actions they investigate “do not have corresponding consciously made 
decisions or conscious intentions among their causes” (Mele, 2013; 2). Mele goes on to claim 
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that there’s no reason to expect these actions, flexing a wrist, to involve free will. Invoking the 
relevance of moral responsibility in the topic of free will, he claims that the actions investigated 
have no moral import; flexing a wrist (in the case of an experiment, as opposed to a case where 
it might signal an order to kill, for example) does not present a moral decision. There’s no reason 
not to do it, so there’s no reason to deliberate, consider pros and cons, and to exercise your free 
will to make a choice. Mele posits that, since free will isn’t utilized in the actions investigated, 
the studies do not make any claim, positive or negative, about the existence of free will. While 
Mele might be correct in asserting that heretofore neuroscience has left the issue wide open, 
there is reason to believe that decisions of any sort, with or without moral implication, will 
proceed through the same pathway. It’s not like if there are two brains, one acting unconsciously, 
the other acting consciously. Both states of processing, conscious and unconscious, proceed 
through the same neural pathways. As we will see in Chapter 3, there are just extra mechanisms 
involved during conscious processing.
Eliminitive incompatibilists claim that the feeling that our phenomenological aspect of 
free will, the part we experience consciously, has a causal role in our decisions is an illusion. 
Eliminative incompatibilists claim that unconscious neural activity dictates how the body will 
react to external stimulation, whereas our conscious experience of free will is an interpretation 
of this unconscious decision. Importantly, this interpretation occurs just before the action 
itself, is usually consistent with the action, and is therefore entirely convincing of the idea, the 
illusion, that the activity is caused by the conscious intention to act. Illusionism, so it’s called, 
is supported by members of the scientific community (Wegner), in addition to philosophers 
(Smilansky). Smilansky proposes that “illusion has a large and positive role to play in the 
issue of free will” (Smilansky, 2000: 6; see Smilanksy, 2002: 11). More specifically, he says 
that “humanity is fortunately deceived on the free will issue, and this seems to be a condition 
of civilized morality and personal value” (11). This is seemingly in line with an evolutionary 
biological perspective that we evolved to possess this nearly unimpeachable illusion because 
it makes for the most productive means, vis a vis moral responsibility and legal systems, to 
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preserving our species. Similarly, Wegner wraps his version of illusionism in the proposal that 
we would be wrong to think that the illusion of free will denounces its import and prevalence.
In this chapter, I will focus on the potions of Wegner, Kane, and McKenna. These three 
will act as representatives of their respective camps (eliminitive incompatibilism, indeterminism, 
and compatibilism) in order to simplify the process of describing the variety of positions and the 
problems with each that I will address with my position.
Wegner and Free Will as illusion
Daniel Wegner uses mental pathology and strange phenomena that distort perceptions of 
agency (trance states, Ouiji board spelling) as a framework for his theory of free will. He uses 
cases in which people act without willing it or will it without acting to study that he calls the 
theory of apparent mental causation.
To begin, Wegner describes a relatively obscure, but frightening pathological case 
of action without will: alien hand syndrome. He explains that alien hand syndrome is a 
neuropsychological disorder wherein the patient experiences the movement of their hand as if it 
had a mind of its own, a result of damage to specific region of the brain on the side contralateral 
to the alien hand. One patient’s hand would:
Tenaciously grope for and grasp any nearby object, pick and pull at her clothes, and 
even grasp her throat during sleep... She slept with the arm tied to prevent nocturnal 
misbehavior. She never denied that her left arm and hand belonged to her, although 
she did refer to her limb as though it were an autonomous entity (Banks et al., 1989; 
p. 456)
This example highlights the difficulty of understanding an experiential phenomenon as it can 
only be self-reported by the individual that they willed an action or not. In the case of someone 
with alien hand syndrome, it may appear to a third person perspective that the patient willingly 
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moved their hand, yet the patient would point out, most likely with fear and dread, that they did 
not have the conscious experience of authoring the movement of their hand. This is an example 
of a person who can perform an action while the feeling of doing it is absent.
These two variables, doing and the feeling of doing, delineate four ways in which we 
can experience action and will. Doing something and not feeling that we’ve done it, like with 
alien hand syndrome, results in a condition Wegner calls automatism. On the flip side, not doing 
something and feeling like we have is an illusion of control, like people thinking they control 
the function of a machine by pressing a button when the button really only works on random 
occasions (as is the case in some psychology experiments that test the range of our sense of 
contingency between pressing a button and something happening). Wegner calls these the special 
cases; normally, our activities fall into one of two other options: not doing something and not 
feeling like we’re doing it (or normal inaction), and doing something and feeling that we’ve done 
it (normal voluntary action). Wegner’s position is a little weak in that he leaves it unclear how 
we can and should distinguish between all of these cases, most of them requiring self-reportage, 
which may not be possible, or may not be truthful. This inability to distinguish clearly is one 
problem that I will address in my proposal.
What is most interesting, in light of how pathology can alter our perception of normal 
voluntary action, is how voluntary action works. To determine whether our experience of free 
will is capable of causing neural activity, we must determine if it can be observed as a path of 
cause and effect. Causality, Wegner points out, “is an event, not a thing or a characteristic or 
attribute of an object” (Wegner, 2004; 3), so we cannot rely on the sense that our experience 
inherently plays a causal role. We must investigate if experience can be empirically identified as 
a cause of an observable effect.
Philosophers and scientists familiar with the works of Libet (wherein readiness potentials 
are present and initiating action before the conscious will to do so) and Wegner become startled 
by the concept that free will requires empirical verification. If this is the case, then surely we 
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will lose free will entirely because the science seems to imply that conscious experience is a 
byproduct, and therefore does not play a role in the pathway of cause and effect. In Wegner’s 
precis to his book, The Illusion of Free Will, he includes a section for open peer commentary, and 
a follow up response section. In his responses, he cites a couple positions from neurosurgeons 
and psychologists (Bogen, Kihlstrom, and Zuriff) whose peer commentary reflect the 
interpretation that the experience of free will is an illusion according to Wegner’s argument.
Wegner distinguishes between empirical and phenomenological free will. 
Phenomenological free will is the experience, or sensation, of free will. Wegner posits that the 
experience does not have a causal role in our actions. In his terms, the experience of free will is 
not predictive enough of action for it to be a valid causal factor. We’ve seen how the correlation 
between the ‘feeling of doing’ and actually ‘doing’ can vary as a result of pathology, strange 
phenomena, or plain trickery on the part of psychology researchers. Wegner makes an even 
stronger case by elaborating a variety of cases with misconstrued phenomenological free will, 
such as the patient with alien hand syndrome. By observing the lack of predictive power that the 
experience of free will has on our actions, we can determine that it cannot play a causal role in 
all action.
On the other hand, Wegner describes the empirical free will as the “real causal sequence 
underlying human behavior” in which “each of our actions is really the culmination of an 
intricate set of physical and mental processes” (5). Interestingly, Wegner is sure to point out that 
this includes “psychological mechanisms that correspond to the traditional concept of will – in 
that they involve linkages between our thoughts and our actions” (5).
This is a concise, logical argument that culminates in Wegner’s theory of apparent mental 
causation where people “experience conscious will when they interpret their own thought as 
the cause of their action” (6). Wegner proposes three key sources of this interpretation: priority, 
consistency, and exclusivity. Thus, according to his theory of apparent mental causation, we 
have the feeling of control, as agents of our actions, when our thoughts (A) precede said action, 
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(B) are consistent with the performance of said action, and (C) when we do not perceive an 
overwhelming sense of alternative causes of said action. These sensations converge into a strong 
feeling of authorship, which we experience as conscious will, as “Yeah, I did that.” Wegner 
argues that this feeling is an illusion of control we obtain from the rapid interpretation of many 
coincidental sensations. As Wegner writes with sobering conciseness, “experiences of conscious 
will thus arise from processes whereby the mind interprets itself – not from processes whereby 
mind creates action” (1). He claims that the experience of free will itself does not have sway over 
actions. The experience is only an interpretation of the events in our brain that cause the action.
Wegner presents a fascinating example of how an action that is clearly not caused by us, 
the moving of a tree branch, can feel authored if these three factors aligned. If you imagined that 
branch moving and then it moved, and moved exactly as you imagined, and was not caused by 
anything else, like a squirrel, you would probably, first, be very taken aback and then, second, 
begin to consider, no matter how absurd it seems, that you might have caused the movement. 
Imagine that this predictiveness occurred all-day every-day as you interpreted the actions your 
body performs: you would no longer consider it strange and would assume, as we do, that we, 
that is, our conscious wills, have caused the action.
Wegner is very aware that this arouses fear that we will lose free will, and he is very 
careful to distinguish, again, that he is only calling the experience of free will an illusion, not 
the empirical fact that mental events can influence our actions. However, I do not agree that 
he addresses these concerns enough. He asks why this experience exists: “What good is an 
epiphenomenon?” (8) and claims that phenomenal free will provides us with a sense that our 
body has authored an action, like how emotions provide us with a sense of how our body is 
responding to events. As, such, conscious will “serves to accentuate and anchor an action in the 
body” in a way that “renders the act one’s own in a personal and memorable way” (10, emphasis 
added). Ultimately, conscious will is an important check that “serves as an indicator of mental 
processes or states, and that thus informs us about the status of our own mental systems” (10). 
My contention is: who is the ‘us’ in that sentence. Is ‘us’ our conscious will? If so, is making our 
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conscious will aware of this check advantageous even if there’s no way for ‘us’, our conscious 
will, to turn around and use that knowledge to reorient the body? What makes more sense is that 
‘us’ means our unconscious brain.  This would this suggest that consciousness is just a tool the 
brain uses to check up on itself.
Wegner’s claim is that this is enough. We can rest assured that our body has empirical 
free will, which is to say that the actions our bodies perform are influenced by mental events. 
Even if our conscious will lacks true causal control, it is, in the end, usually an accurate 
interpretation of what is actually happening in the brain. Given this position Wegner describes a 
philosophy of responsibility taking into account the acausal nature of conscious will. He claims 
that:
Causality is something you can see in mechanical systems, a relationship between 
events, and is not dependent on what kinds of events are involved. Responsibility, 
on the other hand, involves persons – those selves that are constructed through the 
process of identifying actions as caused by an agent (39).
Thus, responsibility and causality are like apples and oranges to Wegner. Equating responsibility 
to causality is a mistake to Wegner.
Responsibility is a human question that involves our unique ‘selves’, and our sense 
of authorship. Wegner writes that “the allocation of responsibility is dependent on regarding 
something as a person,” because only a person can regard oneself as a person, and only 
something that regards itself as a person can “take an intentional stance toward itself” (39). 
According to Wegner, the intentional stance occurs naturally through the power of the illusion 
of phenomenological free will. When we take this intentional stance toward ourselves the 
“real work of responsibility is done” because the accused person “accepts responsibility and 
experiences moral emotions such as shame or guilt (or in the case of positive actions, pride)” 
(39). While I agree with this perspective, that a great deal of work could be done by such an 
illusion, to which I will return in Chapter 2, I object with the claim that causality is not relevant 
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to responsibility.
Just as much as our feeling of guilt in the face of action is based on thinking we have 
control, an equal and opposite feeling of innocence can be based on thinking we do not have 
control. Can we merely trust that this illusion of free will is infallible, unimpeachable? I believe 
that some of the strength of this illusion is endowed by the cultural background in which we 
are raised. From the youngest point when we can be considered thinking human beings, we are 
raised with the assumption of choice, and responsibility. Some people end up feeling responsible 
for different things merely because there were raised to believe they are responsible for some 
things and not others. This indicates the influence of cultural background over the illusion. If we 
accept, unanimously, that the experience of free will is an illusion, and this becomes common 
knowledge that future generations are raised believing, who’s to say if they will feel the same 
sense of intention toward themselves?
As such, my problems with Wegner’s view are as follows:
1. He does not provide sufficient guidelines for how to distinguish between voluntary and 
involuntary action, especially in light of his claim that phenomenological free will is 
not properly predictive.
2. He does not sufficiently address what the goal of the phenomenological free will is, if 
it has no causal role.
3. He does not account for the fact that sensations of free will are changed by our social 
and personal conception of responsibility.
4. He does not account for empirical findings that consciousness does have a causal role 
in decision making and information processing in the brain.
Kane and Free Will as liberty
Robert Kane has been the dean of Libertarian philosophy for decades. He has 
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summarized his and other Libertarians positions on countless occasions, and single handedly 
written and edited a library of books and articles on the topic of free will, including the Oxford 
Handbook of Free Will. His most recent article is a succinct 2012 contribution to a symposium 
on Mark Balageur’s book, Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem, in which he, Kane that is, 
compares and contrasts his position with that of Balageur’s, a fellow libertarian. I will start 
toward the end of this piece, “Torn decisions, luck, and libertarian free will: comments on 
Balaguer’s free will as an open scientific problem,” where he more clearly defines his position, 
and then work my way through the beginning when he distinguishes key aspects of his theory, 
which should highlight some of the diversity in Libertarian perspectives.
Philosophical Libertarianism, in general, holds that the human capacity for choice is 
incompatible with the domain of physical determinism of any sort. Thus, libertarianism holds 
an indeterminist stance about the way our consciousness makes decisions. For the most part, 
disagreement among Libertarian philosophers centers around what the nature of indeterminism is 
as it presents in the brain, and at what step in a decision making process it occurs.
Within the range of Libertarian views, Kane identifies Self-Forming Actions (SFAs) and 
Plural Voluntary Control (PVC) as central pillars of his position.  SFAs are those activities in 
the brain over which the individual has indeterministic control and therefore define the range of 
activities for which an agent is responsible. It is the process by which an agent self-determines a 
choice, or decides which option is the most desireable, or best in some way. In being the origin of 
this decision, not having been deterministically influenced by the exterior world, we would have 
control over and thereby responsibility for actions precipitated by those choices. Kane is careful 
to note that “not all acts done of our own free wills have to be undetermined, only those acts by 
which we made ourselves into the kinds of persons we are—namely, the “will-setting” or “self-
forming actions” (SFAs) that are required for ultimate responsibility” (2007, 26). This is to say 
that the import of SFAs rests in their enabling us to generate a decision about choices that define 
who we are, or choices with which we identify and of which we can consider ourselves agents.
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The libertarian view of free will shares a great deal of qualities with my own, however, I 
disagree with what Kane distinguishes as most important for the existence of free will, and with 
the likelihood of certain factors having a role. Kane declares that free will is “the power of agents 
to be the ultimate creators (or originators) and sustainers of their own ends or purposes” (1996, 
4). The reader will note that this relates very closely to my theory of free will as I briefly noted 
in the introduction: “Free will is our ability to be free to choose, to generate our own decision 
without the complete control of our biological makeup and external circumstances… Being 
able to generate our own unique motivation for a given action is free will.” Self-forming actions 
are what make us the ultimate creators, or originators, of our own ends and purposes. SFAs are 
something that we consciously create in order to precipitate actions toward our purposes.
How do we come to create these SFAs? Kane writes that SFAs “are the end-products of 
goal-directed or teleological cognitive processes in the brain in which indeterminism in some of 
the neural events involved in these cognitive processes functions as a hindrance or obstacle to 
the attainment of their goals” (2012, 56). Thus, he identifies indeterminacy in the brain as a key 
factor by establishing requisite obstacles. In providing difficulty, the indeterminacy behooves us 
to make an effort toward one goal or another. As such, SFAs present an effort of will to proceed 
toward one goal or another that is distinguished from when the brain merely proceeds through 
unhindered, deterministic pathways toward thermodynamically favored results.
The way in which we create SFAs requires a condition that Kane calls Plural Voluntary 
Control (PVC). According to Kane:
Agents have plural voluntary control over a set of options (e.g. choices) when they 
are able to bring about whichever of the options or choices they will to bring about, 
when they will to do so, for the reasons they will to do so, on purpose, rather than 
accidentally or inadvertently or by mistake, without being coerced or compelled in 
doing so or willing to do so or otherwise controlled in doing so or willing to do so 
by other agents or mechanisms (2012, 56).
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Essentially, Kane is describing the PVC nature of free willing causality as a situation wherein 
an agent is confronted by multiple possible options and has the liberty to “choose in more than 
one way,” hence plural, and is performing this choice in a way that is not influenced by external 
mechanisms, or, in other words, is able to choose “voluntarily, intentionally and rationally” 
(2012, 56), hence voluntary control.
Kane distinguishes between his theory of PVC with a common Libertarian theory that 
only requires Alternative Possibilities (AP) to satisfy free will. AP allows for what was originally 
thought of as an ambiguous future where the result is not predictable to one, single, determined 
solution based on the given causes. Kane argues that AP is not enough (though it is part of the 
solution), there must be the factor of effort required to achieve one possibility or another, this is 
the ‘willing’ component of free willing.
Kane also refers to these goal-directed cognitive processes as ‘volitional streams.’ This 
allows him to elaborate further on the nature of control, or liberty, that an agent has over a 
decision. Kane posits that “one must allow that there can be multiple such volitional streams 
within the agent,” which vaguely appeals to the theory of AP, “the agent must have a certain 
kind of control over each of these volitional streams,” and “the choice that results from either 
of the volitional streams can be said to be brought about by the agent” (2012, 57), which 
assures that the agent represents the origin of the choice, the creator of the decision to proceed 
through one volitional stream or another. Kane concludes that “it is owing to the fact that either 
volitional stream might succeed in attaining its goal, which would thereby be brought about by 
the agent’s goal-directed cognitive process, that the agent exercises plural voluntary control over 
the decision itself (the SFA)” (2012, 57). Thus, Kane posits that control over the choice and the 
effort of willing one choice or another are two pillars of SFAs, which enable agents to act with 
free will.
Let’s look more closely at what Kane identifies as an indeterminacy in the brain. In 
agreement with Balageur, Kane cites the existence of “microlevel indeterminacies in the timings 
22
of firings of individual neurons that would give rise to some background neural noise.” Kane 
argues that these low level effects, which are currently understood to be a result of quantum 
uncertainty, are enough for free will. While some claim that the brain as a whole, and the 
decisions and actions it generates, is too many orders of magnitude too large for these low level 
indeterminacies to have any noticeable effect, Kane claims that this is okay. “One doesn’t need 
a thunderclap of indeterminism in the brain to get free will,” he writes, “just a sprinkle will do” 
(2012, 52). The precise nature of these microlevel indeterminacies will be examined more in 
the proceeding chapters. However, given this stance, I will state, now, that I disagree that this 
“sprinkle” is enough for free will. Kane is underselling the import of indeterminism and how 
it influences the higher structures of the brain. If the indeterminacies are indeed erased through 
supersession by orders of magnitude of complexity, and if these indeterminacies only amount to 
a random, content-less, neural noise, then this would account for the existence of APs, but not 
of a radical PVC, which Kane claims is necessary for free will. Of course, I cannot blame Kane 
for not pursuing the science himself, but I object with his accepting that this, as he recounts, is at 
best an open scientific question. Given his account of what we currently know, it doesn’t seem 
like PVC is part of the equation. Ultimately, I disagree with how he interprets the science; there 
is scientific support for a great deal more indeterminacy in the brain than a sprinkle, albeit not a 
thunderclap.
In opposition to Balageur, Kane insists that self-forming actions, which Balageur calls 
torn decisions, cannot be only phenomenological, or experience based. If they were, they would 
only represent the way in which our decisions feel like they were not deterministic, while 
leaving the options open for whether or not they were determined on an ontological level. Kane 
claims that “one cannot resolve free will questions by appeal to introspection alone” (2012, 53). 
Balageur only represents his torn decisions phenomenologically, but if he also meant for them 
to have implications on an ontological level, then, Kane insists, “they would amount to my 
SFAs” (2012, 53). This is only a semantic disagreement between them, but it reminds us of a key 
requirement for free will: that it must not be just phenomenological. Recall Wegner’s distinction 
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between phenomenological free will and empirical free will. In order for Kane’s libertarian 
free will to exist, the phenomenology of free will must have a causal influence on the physical 
actions (the empirical, or ontological aspect) of the brain. We must be at liberty to act upon the 
world, and ourselves, in the way we wish. Otherwise, we slip back into Wegner’s view that the 
phenomenology of free will is an illusion that convinces us to treat empirical free will in the 
same way as we would treat conscious free will.
It is important to establish the radical nature of Kane’s view as a libertarian. Many 
libertarians are satisfied by simple two-stage models of free will. Two stage models represent an 
explanation of free will that dates back to William James, who articulated that free will could 
be defined as a chance occurrence of alternative possibilities, followed by a choice made by 
the agent to execute one choice or the other. Kane poses a stronger two stage model wherein 
practical choices (procedural things like deciding how to get from the attic hideout to the safe 
house two streets away) are readily explained in this model, while moral choices (should I escape 
to the safe house, or turn myself in) require a more controlled version of the first, chance stage. 
His PVC theory describes how the role of indeterminacy in rendering the choice difficult to 
make forces the agent to exert effort, to will a choice. This added requirement places Kane in a 
somewhat extreme place as far as libertarians are concerned.
Thus, my concerns with Kane’s Libertarian perspective are as follows:
1. Where do we draw the line at actions that have “made ourselves into the kinds of 
persons we are”? Does this involve intention vs. no intention, endorsement vs. no 
endorsement? Kane doesn’t say.
2. Kane suggests that only a sprinkle of indeterminacy, and thus of the potential for free 
will, is enough. Maybe a sprinkle would be the bare minimum, but there is evidence 
for more.
3. Kane discusses goal-oriented behavior as the source of SFAs, but does not discuss how 
intention and motivation lead an agent to select one goal over another. According to 
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Kane, it is unclear whether a free willing agent has control over the goal they pursue 
with the libertarian free will he describes.
McKenna and Free Will as Ability
The central strength of Michael McKenna’s compatibilist position is the defence of Harry 
Frankfurt’s position that refutes the need for Alternative Possibilities. Frankfurt suggests that if 
a decision is morally significant and the agent has control, then there is no need for alternative 
possibilities. Opposition from incompatibilists suggests that this implicitly assumes that the 
entire process is deterministic, and therefore contentious in another way. McKenna defends 
Frankfurt by claiming that an example can be made wherein only some alternative possibilities 
are blocked while a decision is in control of the agent and is therefore morally significant.
As a compatibilist, McKenna is interested in diffusing incompatibilist objections to 
determinism. He writes that the incompatibilist holds that, “determinism rules out free will and 
moral responsibility by ruling out an agent’s access to alternative possibilities,” (2003, 201) the 
assumption being that, in a determinist network, all effects are directly the result of their causes, 
going all the way back to the origin of the deterministic universe, at which point all fate was 
sealed. In rebuttal, McKenna is determined to show that “if free will and moral responsibility do 
not require alternative possibilities, then this incompatibilist argument is otiose” (2003, 201).
McKenna has designed the “Brain Malfunction” example of Casper the philosophy 
professor as a demonstration of free will without alternative possibilities at the moment of 
choice. Casper comes across a state of the art ‘Make-it-the-Case-Device’. The machine has a 
large screen, on which flashes a genie who explains:
Casper, just beneath this screen are two buttons, one marked ‘The Morally 
Good Thing To Do’ and another marked ‘The Morally Bad Thing To Do’. Let us 
abbreviate them as ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ respectively. If you press the Bad button you 
will immediately make it the case that one million dollars are deposited into your 
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bank account. The money will be drawn, in one dollar increments, from the savings 
accounts of one million college professors. The transaction will be untraceable. 
If you press the Good button you will immediately make it the case that an entire 
village of people in the Amazon is cured of an otherwise fatal disease. Saving the 
villagers will not involve any money and by doing so you will not be stealing from 
your peers. You cannot select both buttons and this opportunity will not present 
itself again. You have ten seconds to select your option (2003, 209-210).
I will directly quote the remainder of the example because the precise language is important:
A timer appears on the screen and begins to count down from ten.
Casper pauses to consider these two options, quickly assessing the import of each. 
He considers the article he read in last Sunday’s New York Times on the villagers’ 
plight. He is fully aware of the urgency of their condition. He also considers his 
sparse salary as a philosophy professor and he squirms at the thought of stealing 
from his peers. Imagining that shiny, red Mercedes convertible roadster in the 
window, as the counter ticks away from 3 seconds to 2 greedily he takes the plunge 
and presses the Bad button. ‘Ah, dinner out tonight!’ Casper thinks to himself.
As it turns out, although Casper was unaware of this difficulty, and although there 
is no reason Casper should have been aware of this difficulty, at the time at which 
Casper greedily decided to press the Bad button, Casper had a small lesion on his 
brain that blocked the neural pathway constitutive of (or correlated with) a decision 
to push the Good button during that ten second interval. Casper could not have 
decided to press the Good button (2003, 210).
This example seeks to highlight the idea that a morally significant decision (pressing the bad 
button) can present without alternative possibilities (like being unable to press the good button 
because a lesion prevented that decision) and still be under the control of the agent, because he 
used reason to consider the options and decide, before lesioning occurred, that the desire for 
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money is most significant. His relief after the decision (‘Ah, dinner out tonight’), in addition 
to the envy just before (shiny, red mercedes convertible roadster) indicates that he conducted 
reasonable deliberation that voluntarily and intentionally resulted in the choice to press the Bad 
button. Thus, even if he didn’t have the alternative to press the Good button at the moment of 
choice, he still had the ‘control’ to make the choice he did, and it was indeed morally significant.
The thrust of the example lies in the fact that all moments leading up to the decision were 
unaffected by the lesion. Only at the precise moment when the ‘final act of deciding’ occurred, 
I gather from the example and the theory that follows, did the lesion appear, blocking the 
alternative pathway. McKenna’s opposition to the need for alternative possibilities is unique in 
that it does not try to block the need for all decisions, only those that are morally significant. And 
nor does it block all components of deliberation. In contrast, the many defenses of Frankfurt’s 
proposal (that APs are unnecessary) have almost exclusively “attempted to pollute all actional 
pathways other than the actual one in which the agent acts” (2003, 205). From this I understand 
that McKenna distinguishes between steps, or actional pathways, in the decision making process, 
such as (1) when Casper deliberates on his income and the fancy car outside, and (2) the step of 
the exact decision, when he eschews all else and presses the button. All the preliminary moments 
(deliberations, etc.) can obey the need for APs, because they are not morally significant. On 
the other hand, during the moment of moral significance, the decision itself, the need for APs 
shatters and determinism displays a route for free will to exist.
In his words, McKenna claims that a defense of Frankfurt’s philosophy that APs are 
unnecessary should “attempt to close off all morally significant alternatives without attempting 
to pollute all alternative actional pathways within an agent’s control” (2003, 206).  In order to 
pursue such a theory, McKenna insists that a “Frankfurt-defender” should distinguish between 
“some class of actional pathways comprising morally insignificant alternatives,” which, he writes 
are those that “could not aid in grounding the judgment that an agent in a Frankfurt example 
is morally responsible for what she does” (2003, 206).  In the case of Casper, the alternatives 
to pressing the bad button were not considered “deliberatively significant”  and are therefore 
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irrelevant to the moral decision. Only those deliberations prior to the decision are relevant. 
Thus, the existence of alternative possibilities in the wake of these deliberations, is unnecessary, 
because they, alone, determine what the decision will be. Due to the lack of indeterminism in 
between the deliberation and the decision, the relevance of any alternatives is negated because 
there is a direct causal link, and therefore a reliable contingency of the final decision on the 
deliberation. McKenna’s theory is called the Limited Blockage Strategy, because it takes aim at 
blocking APs for only the morally relevant step while displaying a determinist framework for a 
decision resulting in moral responsibility.
McKenna’s Limited Blockage Strategy refutation of theories requiring APs, or theories 
opposing Frankfurt’s assertion that all APs are irrelevant, credits the decision, and not the 
prerequisites to the decision (intentions, deliberations) with moral importance over all else. 
The goal of McKenna’s position is to block the need for alternative possibilities for the parts of 
decision-making that are morally significant, thereby dismantling the indeterminist need for APs 
during moral decision-making. As such, he holds that it doesn’t matter what deliberation leads 
up to the decision, only the decision and the proceeding action are morally significant, and since 
he has shown that APs are unnecessary for the decision to be freely willed, his argument appears 
successful.
Some deliberations will not contribute to the decision, according to McKenna, and 
therefore do not represent morally salient material. This is tantamount to the idea that we can’t 
be held responsible for thought, only action; it doesn’t matter if we hate someone, we cannot be 
held responsible for that alone. Only if we commit hateful acts are we morally responsible. If 
this sounds too strong (what about hateful speech?), I would hold, and I’m sure McKenna would 
agree, that speech and expression of thought counts as action, and therefore as something that 
behooves punishment if it is a moral wrong. This theory neatly aligns with our legal framework 
for responsibility in which we can not be punished for our thoughts if we keep them to ourselves.
I object to the idea that the brain lesion does not inhibit free will, and in my objection I 
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appeal to the goal of this legal framework with which McKenna seems to be aligning. The reason 
why thought isn’t punishable is that thought is subject to change, immediate and unpredictable 
change, and does not perfectly predict action. Just because someone seems to think in one way, 
does not mean they will act that way as well. This grants people a kind of second chance. If they 
hate someone and have every intention to hurt them, a truly morally reprehensible person might 
go through with their intentions, having no reservations, only malice, whereas a person who 
may be good at heart will have reservations that would lead them to choose not to hurt another. 
The person could have been confused or in a state of vulnerability when they reasoned that the 
subject of their hate deserves to be hurt. The assumption our legal framework makes is that 
anyone could ‘come to their senses’ at the final moment and execute a choice that had little to 
no visible prerequisite beliefs (should I cite something here?). Thus, the alternative option must 
remain a possibility until the cessation of cognitive processes involved in precipitating the action, 
and until all actional pathways are completed.
McKenna may refute this, claiming that any act of ‘coming to our senses’ would 
involve additional actional pathways that are as much morally insignificant as those prior. If 
this objection were to be made, I would suggest that our understanding of the actual stages of 
decision-making, as far as neuroscience has elucidated, are incomplete. However, what we do 
know is that decision-making includes a great deal of complex recurrent networks, monitoring, 
and feedback mechanisms. To isolate a precise moment of ‘decision’ from the neural activity 
before it disregards the complexity of this network, which also includes activity in the wake of 
a decision that continues to regulate the subsequent action. There is no point at which a decision 
is made and all relevant cognition ceases, waiting for the action to be carried through and to 
receive new information and start over for the next action. Deliberation is not a strictly pre-
decision phenomenon, it continues to influence the nature of a decision and how we execute the 
appropriate actions after a ‘decision’ has been made.
If McKenna considers deliberation to be morally irrelevant, then what distinguishes 
deliberation from decision? Willed action from reflex? It seems like the causal involvement of 
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consciousness in the decision making process is pivotal for an action to be considered morally 
salient. At the very least, conscious intent is pivotal for legal ramifications.
It would be foolish of me to claim that all thought has moral significance. It seems 
clear to me that there is a clear line between ‘idle thought’, in which our mind wanders and 
experiments in ways we have no intention of bringing about, and ‘intentional thought’, in 
which we deliberate on our precise intentions in a way that influences our subsequent action. I 
propose that intentional conscious thought is morally significant, and under control of the agent, 
and required for a freely willed decision. These two kinds of thought are distinguished by the 
presence of intention.
1. Thus, my objections to McKenna can be summarized as follows:
2. He inaccurately isolates a decision from its intentional deliberation.
3. He claims that APs are unnecessary for free will, but allows them for the intentional 
deliberation leading up to the decision.
4. He claims that the lack of APs is not tantamount to predetermination.
5. He does not discuss the need to generate the decision consciously, or discuss why 
deliberation isn’t considered more relevant to the decision.
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chApter 2
self-generAtIng motIvAtIon
You are who you choose to be.
~Hogarth Hughes, from “The Iron Giant”
A discussion of free will involves a great number of words that are used in everyday 
speech (e.g. intention, reason, and choice), as well as some large, but familiar concepts (e.g. 
responsibility, morality, and freedom). In order to broach the topic of free will, we must first 
agree on the meaning of our terms. There is no way to discuss each term and then the next in a 
linear fashion, so I will have trouble describing this constellation of terms clearly. First I will 
indulge in a brief etymological analysis, then we can dive into the terminology of practical 
reasoning, and finally I will summarize my position and the specific, philosophical concerns that 
it can address.
The import of free will in human life is obvious. Terminology surrounding free will 
can be traced back to some of the oldest recorded languages, which highlights the fact that the 
concept of free will has been central to human life and communication for millennia. We can 
trace the etymological history of volition, a term closely related to free will, from vurita and 
varam in ancient Sanskrit languages, to Old Slavic veleti, to command, volt in Old Latin, and 
volo, I wish, in Latin. From volo come the words “volition”, “voluntary”, and “malevolent/
benevolent”, to name a few. Volition describes the sense in which we have a wish in mind, and 
we order ourselves to perform it.
A related word is “will”, whose etymological roots return to the Old Slavic veleti and go 
down the path of the Gothic wili and wiljan, to wish. From wiljan comes the German wollen, 
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Old English willa, Middle English wille, and our modern day word, will, whose definition I will 
compare directly to that of volition in the following section. Will, alone, doesn’t suggest that I 
don’t just have a wish or a desire to see something happen, will implies the wherewithal to bring 
something about for a reason. With the invocation of reason comes the invocation of practical 
reasoning.
Free Will and Practical reasoning
Practical Reasoning is a field of philosophy that parses out how we think about things. 
As the name implies, the human ability to reason is the center of exploration. Practical reason is 
the human ability to apply reason through reflection and deliberation in order to decide in what 
way to act. While this pursuit seems to directly invoke the question of free will, it is interesting 
to note that the more metaphysical theories of free will do not strike philosophers of practical 
reasoning as a primary concern. This is because ‘practical’ reason is about how reasoning is 
applied and the consequences of its application, not how or whether reason can originate freely. 
It is assumed that our reason brings about our action through deliberation, and that our reason 
is either rational or irrational. Whether our rationality or irrationality is freely willed or not is 
not up to debate between philosophers in this field; however, I believe that practical reasoning 
has a great deal to offer questions of free will because of the fact that it addresses the topic of 
what comes next (of what we do with our free will) without being stymied by debate over the 
fundamental question of whether or not we have free will. I also find that some terminology and 
questions that are used in practical reasoning are more readily translatable into empirical study, 
which bridges the mostly abstract conversation about free will and the observation based process 
of science.
When a reason is sufficient enough to precipitate an action, it is a normative motivation. 
A reason is normative if it doesn’t just explain why I am doing something (ie “I’m escaping 
through this trap door because the police are hot on my heels), but can verify what is moving me 
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to act, which tells us what about the action we endorse as right (ie “Having the police hot on my 
heels is what motivates me to snatch what little remains of this burned manuscript and escape 
through this trap door”). In the field of practical reasoning, we endorse things because we value 
them. We value one thing over another based on our identity. We identify ourselves as a certain 
kind of person, which behooves us to hold certain things of value, to endorse them as genuine 
motivators, as normative, and thereby act on them. Ultimately, motivation comes down to our 
identity, and how it compels us to uphold the values it entails. Reasoning is the process by which 
we measure reasons against the values of our identity to decide which reasons we endorse as 
normative, as genuinely motivating us to act.
Christine Korsgaard has written a great deal in the field of practical reasoning on 
motivation, identity, and morality. In “The Sources of Normativity,” she discusses the basis of 
ethics in human life as well as how, and why, we should and do obey ethical laws. She writes that 
“the reflective structure of human consciousness requires that you identify yourself with some 
law or principle, which will govern your choices. It requires you to be a law to yourself. And that 
is the source of normativity” (103-104).
The human ability to be self-aware is universally recognized (I can recognize that 
I am writing this, and you are aware that you are reading it, unless one of us has a severe 
neuropathological disorder, which I hope and assume is not the case). We are even aware, 
frequently, of the precise way in which the stages of deliberation proceed (I need to prevent the 
police from reading these papers, but I don’t have time to burn them with this lighter one at a 
time, but being caught with them is worse than being caught without them... maybe I have time 
to cross the room and toss them all in the dying embers of the fireplace, etc., etc.... until we 
decide we don’t have enough time to deliberate on the best route and simply toss them in the fire, 
making sure to pull the rug back over the trapdoor as we steal away). Science has yet to elaborate 
the physical mechanisms behind this capacity of self-awareness. Whatever the mechanism, given 
our reflective psychology as we understand it now, we have the ability to distance ourselves from 
ourselves, to segregate between our thoughts/deliberations and our choices.
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Philosophers of practical reasoning would call this a segregation between a thinking self 
and an active self. This is not to suggest that we are split between two selves, rather, these are 
two sides of the same self. I find that this segregation splits our self roughly in the same way that 
I do later in this chapter (when I address Alternative Possibilities): between (1) the mechanisms 
of deliberation where I propose indeterminism is amplified, and (2) the mechanism when the 
“final” choice is made and determinism regains control over the causal network in order to 
ensure a straightforward causal link between the prior deliberations/intentions and the action. As 
such, I will proceed to use the terminology of thinking and acting selves because it simplifies the 
conversation.
According to Korsgaard, our active selves must unquestioningly submit to the legislation 
of our thinking selves. She writes that, “we are in a position to require things of ourselves... 
we have legislative authority over ourselves” (151). This means that your reflective nature 
dictates your choices according to the most legitimate authority you have: yourself. Korsgaard’s 
argument invokes a Voluntarist position, which suggests that motivation flows through a pathway 
of obligation, which is assigned by a legitimate authority figure (e.g. God, the government, 
parents), who has the power to enforce the law. In contrast to the Voluntarist position, Korsgaard 
claims that being normatively obligated by a legitimate authority is considered free will because 
the only legitimate authority is yourself, not God, not the government, not even your parents (as 
hard as the notion is to shake). Of course, we can acknowledge that the laws of a government, or 
the principles of your parents’ household are just and right, but Korsgaard would hold that we are 
obligating ourselves to uphold that law, and only we can do that. If you obligate yourself, you are 
appealing to your autonomy, which governs your choices freely. The capacity to appeal to your 
own autonomy through reflection with your thinking self is what Korsgaard means by being a 
law to yourself. Being a reflective human makes you follow a law or principle that is dictated by 
yourself.
Our practical identity dictates what laws and principles we will follow. The way you 
advocate for a law, under which to rule yourself, is by valuing one over another, a philosophical 
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position that almost assumes Alternative Possibilities. The way you, as a reflective human, 
advocate for “the principle or law by which you determine your actions” is by assessing which 
one is the law that “you regard as being expressive of yourself” (100). In this way, you value a 
certain law that is expressive of your identity. Your identity is the way you define yourself, and 
your practical identity includes the requisite principles you must follow in order to have assumed 
a given identity. You choose what practical identity you associate with, and follow the principles 
that such an identity is bound to follow. Being a rational agent means that you follow a law that 
you have valued by defining yourself as someone who is disposed to follow such a law.
A rational agent is one who is disposed to make rational, law abiding (personal law, not 
necessarily communal law abiding), decisions based in reason. As Korsgaard put it, “because the 
will is a causality, it must act according to some law or other... since the will is practical reason, 
it cannot be conceived as acting and choosing for no reason” (97-98). Thus, being normatively 
obligated to make a choice by yourself is a force of causality that follows a prescribed set of 
laws. I contend that free will is both a causality and, at some juncture, an independent source of 
indeterminism, which enables our freedom up to the point when we select a practical identity and 
thus generate a reason for our actions ourselves. After this point our rational nature kicks in and 
enables our will to be a causality in the way that philosophers of practical reasoning describe.
The importance of identity in practical reasoning is part of what makes the use of 
philosophies like Korsgaard’s so advantageous for my position on free will. For me, and this 
will become clear in the next section where I lay out my position, the importance of identity 
in calibrating decision-making during complex problem solving demonstrates the importance 
of a conscious mechanism for deliberating on our choices. Further, it establishes how our 
unconscious decisions can fall under the umbrella of free willed choice when it aligns with 
values we endorse as normative for our practical identity. Metaphysical positions on free will, 
such as those described in Chapter 1, rarely focus on the importance of identity. Wegner doesn’t 
explicitly address identity in the wake of his philosophy, but he does hint at it through his 
response to peer reviews on the topic of responsibility. For Daniel Dennett, whom I will address 
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in Chapter 3, an illusionist position such as Wegner’s doesn’t necessarily exclude the capacity for 
free will, and he reconciles it by holding that we have a personal narrative that acts as a practical 
identity that is continuously shaped by our brain for our consciousness to observe.
Korsgaard makes the strong claim that free will and Immanuel Kant’s categorical 
imperative exist by necessity, and that this is not really up to debate. As she writes, “occasionally 
one meets the objection that the freedom that we discover in reflection is a delusion. Human 
actions are causally determined. The philosopher’s bugbear, the Scientific World View, 
threatens once more to deprive us of something we value” (94). However, she concludes that 
“Determinism is no threat to freedom” (95), though she also notes that this “doesn’t mean that 
I am claiming that our experience of our freedom is scientifically inexplicable” (96). According 
to Korsgaard, freedom is ensured by the categorical imperative, which “tells us to act only 
on a maxim which we could will to be law” (98) The only problem that freedom entails is 
that “the will must have a law, but because the will is free, it must be its own law” (emphasis 
added), which Korsgaard claims isn’t an issue because “the categorical imperative merely tells 
us to choose a law. The only constraint on our choice is that it has the form of a law. Nothing 
determines what that law must be. All that it has to be is a law” (98). This position assumes 
that our choice of law is not determined, a common assumption in practical reasoning. While 
assumptions can be dangerous things to make, every field must make some, and I don’t find this 
one to be a problem. I find that we do have non-determined choice, which I will argue in the 
remaining sections of this chapter. Furthermore, as I will show in Chapter 3, the ‘scientific world 
view’ may agree with this philosophical premise.
a neW Model oF Free Will
I propose a two stage model of free will during decision-making that can be understood 
both through the lens of neuroscience and practical reasoning. There are two central contentions 
in my model: determinism vs indeterminism, and conscious vs unconscious. These do not 
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necessarily map onto each other on a one to one basis. In my model, indeterminism is always 
a factor. In biological terms, indeterminism constitutes the random variations of neural activity 
that create noise. Neural noise is the random fluctuation of electrical signals that pass through a 
neural network that can be instigated by the effects of quantum uncertainty. Quantum uncertainty, 
which will be explained further in Chapter 3, enables the random variation of position and 
velocity of particles that make up chemicals and proteins in our brain. This low level variation 
enables slight differences in electrical conductivity of neurons in a circuit. Fluctuations in one 
cell can affect the fluctuations in others, which ultimately creates a system of noise. More and 
more contemporary studies are showing that neural noise is what enables plasticity, changes to 
the way a cell in the brain reacts to stimulation, which underlies learning, memory, and other 
adaptations that are vital to life.
That’s indeterminism in the brain. We can think of determinism as a balance for the 
random, indeterministic noise in the brain. While cells are capable of fluctuating in specific 
properties, other characteristics remain deterministic. For example, neurons fire on an all-or-
nothing basis. They have a specific threshold of activation that they must receive before an 
action potential (more on that in Chapter 3) is initiated, which passed the stimulation signal to 
subsequent neurons. The nature of a cell, wherein it follows laws of electrochemical physics, 
that follows these strict rules of firing upon reaching the activation threshold, is an example of 
determinism. If you know the thresholds and the activation, you can predict the result because it 
follows a deterministic pathway.
That was an example of determinism in the brain. These two can take place at higher 
levels than just a single cell. Neural noise, indeterminism, can take place at a network level if 
cells are active enough to transmit enough signal as to cause fluctuations in subsequent cells, 
thereby amplifying variation in network activity. On the other hand, strict patterns of activity, 
determinism, can also take place at a network level if the indeterministic fluctuations are not 
amplified.
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Thus, we have our mechanisms of indeterminism and determinism, which will be 
instantiated and supported in Chapter 3. Now, we must broach the second contention: conscious 
vs unconscious involvement in free will. I submit that both have a role, though they may be 
unbalanced in terms of quality and quantity of contribution. Consciousness, I propose, can 
direct attention in the brain to amplify specific neural noise so as to focus on specific variations 
of activity. Through directing attention to specific networks and providing feedback to neurons 
within the network telling them to follow specific activity patterns, our conscious attention can 
sculpt neural noise into novel neural pathways and activity patterns. What I propose this does is 
change the criteria, or rules, that neurons in these networks follow to respond to specific kinds of 
stimulation in the future. This can be milliseconds, hours, or even years later.
The unconscious, on the other hand, does not consult higher level cognitive mechanisms, 
such as attention, when directing neural activity. When a stimulus is given to an unconscious 
framework, the resulting activity obeys deterministic rules that define how the neural network 
will respond, what premotor areas it will recruit, and how a response will be precipitated. This 
is a fast and easy way to solve simpler problems. Most animals rely entirely on unconscious 
responses; they are not confronted by enough complex problems for them to have evolved a 
problem-solving capacity through higher level cognitive mechanisms, they simply need to run 
when chased, and feed when hungry. Of course, this is not to say that unconscious systems are 
simple. They are incredibly complex, mostly because they are in charge of most of our lives. 
We are understanding more and more that unconscious systems don’t just control our day to 
day breathing, heart beat, the precise motions of my fingers to maneuver a screwdriver, but also 
things like judgement through implicit bias.
How do these two contentions map onto each other? Unconscious networks rely entirely 
on deterministic neural networks. They do not take the time to consult higher level cognitive 
mechanisms and amplify indeterministic neural noise, they just proceed through the path of least 
resistance, as in, the simplest, fastest way to dodge the attack of a predator from the bushes, or 
a broken limb falling from above. This is not to say there is no indeterminism in unconscious 
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activity, only that the indeterminism isn’t amplified, and ultimately doesn’t end up contributing 
an appreciable amount to the overall activity. Most determinists who acknowledge the success 
of quantum mechanics in describing indeterministic quantum activity in the universe maintain 
that such fluctuations occur at such a low level, quantum level particles, as to be subsumed 
by the patterns of activity that emerge at a higher level from averaged fluctuations. I hold 
that consciousness, on the other hand, applies higher level cognitive mechanisms to amplify 
indeterminism in order to sculpt novel network activity patterns and connectivity. But it isn’t 
so straightforward. When a conscious mechanism changes a neural network, activity through 
that system can progress deterministically such that the changes to cognitive processing map 
directly onto changes in how this processing recruits premotor areas, thereby precipitating a new 
response that reflects changes in cognitive processing.
This process can also be understood in the more intuitive terms of practical reasoning. 
First, we consciously generate a series of motivations (directing attention toward several 
variations of neural noise), which are reasons to be or act a certain way. Through deliberation, we 
weigh the normative quality of these motivations to ascertain which best fits our practical identity 
and which is the most genuinely moving to us. Once we have selected a normative motivation, 
this acts as an unbreakable law for us, as we must uphold a law that we hold ourselves to (if we 
are genuinely motivated by this reason, then there is no way for us not to uphold it, because we 
are rational we must be a law unto ourselves), and we act on the basis of that reason.
So, where does free will fit into this picture? Free will, as I have defined, is the ability to 
consciously self-generate a motivation to act. In being able to self-generate motivations, we can 
act in a way that is free from predetermination by our environment, upbringing, and biological 
makeup. Of course, we can not fly because we will it, and it is true that these factors have a large 
and important impact on our deliberations, but we still have the ability to freely generate novel 
motivations, which can provide the freedom to choose how to act.
Further, I propose that some unconscious decisions proceed through networks of neural 
40
activity and connectivity that have been shaped by our conscious deliberations. As a result, 
once conscious deliberations have been made, this establishes what laws we hold ourselves to, 
and many unconscious decisions are made using that framework. Let’s say you dig a ditch so 
water flows harmlessly alongside the road instead of covering the street in a deep puddle. You 
can take credit both for having dug the ditch to make the first trickles of water flow away from 
the road, but you can also take credit for the continued function of that system you put in place 
a year later. Every once in awhile you may need to fish out a damn of leaves, and thus you can 
feel even more instrumental in the continued function of your beautiful ditch. Similarly, if we 
decide that we absolutely refuse to harm another individual, and then someone surprises you so 
that you unconsciously evade them instead of striking back, you can be proud to have shaped 
your unconscious orientation away from violent responses toward a more passive self defense. I 
will revisit this idea of the unconscious as an extension of the conscious, and therefore part of the 
framework of free will and responsibility, at the end of this chapter and in Chapter 3.
I have four central concerns about those positions that are currently held about free will 
coming out of Chapter 1:
1. What is the nature of indeterminism in the brain? What is it and how does it influence 
large scale cognitive activities?
2. Can alternative possibilities be obtained through indeterminism? What does it mean 
to have been able to do otherwise at a cognitive level?
3. Can we control this indeterminism in a way that does not go through deterministic 
pathways, or merely generate random noise?
4. Can our conscious mind control indeterminism in a way that establishes a middle 
ground between determinism and randomness?
Next, in the remainder of this chapter, I will focus on three key necessities of my philosophical 
position in response to those concerns: the need for alternative possibilities, control over 
indeterminism, and that this control be conscious. These are mainly in response to McKenna, 
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Kane, and Wegner, respectively. My theory of free will responds to these concerns and thereby 
seeks to establish the following requirements for free will, and defend their verity:
1. Alternative possibilities are available through indeterminism.
2. I am the origin of my choices in a way that is neither deterministic nor random.
3. The reasons, or motivations, that guide these choices are generated by my consciousness.
In Chapter 3, when I address the scientific background of my proposal, I will return to the nature 
and role of indeterminism in order to flush out the plausibility of my philosophical claim.
alternative Possibilities
McKenna and Frankfurt’s compatibilist attempts to block the need for alternative 
possibilities is convincing; however, I propose that their attempts do not properly account for free 
will. As such, their compatibilist position fails to defend free will in the face of determinism. The 
failure of Frankfurt’s proposal lies in the fact that it does not allow for alternative possibilities for 
an agent’s intention at all. According to this proposal, intentions are the direct and only result of 
the series of external stimulations, or experiences, to which the agent has been exposed prior to 
decision-making. The external stimuli are not under the control of the agent. The agent merely 
encounters them while navigating space. One can argue that the choice of where to navigate 
is under the distinct control of the agent, that we choose our environments (e.g. whether we 
listen to gypsy jazz or death metal, make friends with athletes or poets, eat nutritiously or not, 
etc.). Ostensibly, having this control over the many aspects of our environment would translate 
to control over that which stimulates us, and, thus, that which influences our intentions and 
therefore our actions.
I agree with this argument, our free willed choice of environment does influence our 
development and identity. However, this scenario cannot be supported by a determinist stance. 
It assumes that we are always in control of our environment, since birth (or maybe even 
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conception) and at every point after. If it is not the case that newborn infants have control over 
what they are and are not exposed to, then it cannot be said that their subsequent navigation is 
freely willed. If an action corresponds directly to an antecedent environment, then the agent must 
have control over their original environment in order to have control over anything. Even given 
control over this original decision, determinism implies that all subsequent experience and action 
would be the predetermined effects of this original antecedent cause, which would eliminate 
control from the hands of the agent the instant after they’ve made their first free willed choice. 
Furthermore, if we don’t assume that an agent can have this miraculous moment of free will at 
the very beginning of their life, then the predetermining choice is made by, say, the parent. As 
such, all subsequent experience and action is the sole cause of the parent, which is the sole cause 
of the grandparent, and so on until the origin of the universe.
For any given action, if the agent does not have control over the antecedent 
environmental stimuli that precipitates their thoughts and intentions, which it would do in a 
deterministic universe, then the agent does not have control over the subsequent action. Further 
one cannot hold that an agent has control over the antecedent environment, because the actions 
the agent underwent to navigate space into this precise environment were actions that the agent 
did not have control over according to the prior argument. The the only way one can assert, 
through an avenue without alternative possibilities, that agent has control over their environment 
is if you also assert that the origin of this cycle of environment shaping action and action shaping 
the environment, the moment of birth, the newborn agent assumes absolute control over their 
environment. This is an extremely difficult position to defend, especially given our knowledge 
about the environment of the womb influencing development of the child prior to birth. Thus, it 
becomes unclear where to draw the line for the moment when an agent becomes an agent and 
obtains control over their primary, germinal environment and can thereby be said to have control 
over what influences them to intend to act a certain way. This is what is required in order to 
defend this compatibilist position
McKenna accounts for this opposition to Frankfurt. He allows that deliberation prior 
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to a choice can include non-deterministic alternative possibilities, which breaks this chain of 
deterministic cause and effect that removes control from the agent; however, he differentiates 
between the period of deliberation and the period of choice-making in order to delineate between 
periods when alternative possibilities are needed and when alternative possibilities are not 
needed.
It is important to note that I agree in a theory of mental causation wherein our intentions 
result in our actions. I hold that our mental considerations directly control our actions, at least 
in non-pathological cases. As such, for a non-pathological individual, our intention to act can be 
said to determine our actions. The concern I have with Frankfurt relates to the manner in which 
our intentions our formed. Given a scenario without alternative possibilities, compatibilism 
suggests that our intentions are determined by our environment, which perpetuates the 
aforementioned cycle. However, given indeterminism, we can assert that the environment does 
not directly determine our intentions. I do not suggest that indeterminism results in a lack of 
determinism between our intentions and our actions, much like McKenna, but solely between 
our environment and our intentions. I suggest that our brain utilizes indeterminism in such a 
way as to create this possibility. Thus, I propose that our free will is our consciousness wielding 
our brain as a tool to amplify indeterminism in order to cause the generation of undetermined 
intentions, which I call self-generated motivations. By necessity, the self-generation of 
motivations requires alternative possibilities, or else there would be nothing undetermined to 
generate. As I will discuss further in Chapter 3, indeterminism gives plausible support for such 
alternative possibilities.
As we saw in McKenna’s example of Jasper the professor, Jasper was fully capable 
of deliberating on the multiple choices he had available such as to accept the money, help the 
villagers, or to back away from the situation entirely. However, when it came time for Jasper to 
make his decision, a miraculous lesion appeared in his brain that prevented him from making 
the choice to help the villagers. McKenna blocked the alternative possibilities that could have 
been available to Jasper at the time of decision. If it is the case that Jasper could not have chosen 
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otherwise as a result of this lesion, I hold that this was not a freely willed decision. As I have 
said, my central objection to McKenna’s proposal lies in his attempt to cleanly differentiate 
between a period of deliberation and a period of choice in a temporal dimension. I believe 
that this does not account for the complexity of decision-making as it occurs in the brain. 
Deliberation is very closely entwined with the actual decision. I would suggest that there was 
still the possibility that Jasper could have chosen otherwise than he did, even though it seemed 
clear that his intention was to press the bad button. It has been found that deliberation continues 
to occur even after the pre-motor areas of the brain are engaged and begin to precipitate the 
motor response, which causes an action to be taken. These further deliberations act a as a variety 
of regulatory mechanisms.
Given the indeterminism he admits into the model for deliberation, it’s entirely plausible 
that, somewhere in the deterministic chain of events that McKenna describes, the insertion of an 
indeterminate intention, during or even after the action is being precipitated, could have provided 
Jasper with the opportunity to have chosen otherwise.  As a result, it could not be assumed that 
he would necessarily follow through with pressing the bad button. By blocking this avenue at 
what McKenna presumes was a safe time, he actually did prevent Jasper from having control 
over which choice he made, which removes free will from the scenario.
This argument relies on disagreeing with how precisely Mckenna blocks Jasper’s 
alternative possibilities. Since my model off free will also includes a compatibilistic level of 
determinism in the connection between a choice and the action it precipitates, it behooves me to 
establish precisely why blocking alternative possibilities with determinism in one way allows for 
free will while the other, McKenna’s proposal, does not. I propose that indeterminism is present 
during conscious decision-making. I would suggest that during unconscious decision-making 
the brain does follow a strictly deterministic pathway, which would accommodate McKenna’s 
block of alternative possibilities. If Jasper had made the decision unconsciously in this scenario, 
then I would agree that blocking the alternative route (pressing the good button) would not 
have made a difference in the causal chain of events and would therefore have not inflicted 
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on his authorship of the choice he made. This is a strong proposal that segregates between the 
fundamental mechanics of consciousness and unconsciousness. Later, when I address the fourth 
concern (i.e. the conscious generation of choice), I will reflect on the nature of the difference 
between conscious decision-making and unconscious decision-making, especially as it relates to 
the concept of responsibility.
For now however, I propose that the failure of McKenna’s system is in his inaccurate 
segregation between the process of deliberation generating a choice, which must be 
indeterministic, we both agree, and the process of a choice generating an action, which must 
be deterministic, we both agree. He segregates the two according to their temporal qualities. 
According to McKenna, if we can just wait until deliberation generates a choice and ceases, 
then we can block alternative choices and avoid affecting the deterministic stage of the process. 
Since we cannot segregate based on time, we should segregate based on what parts of the 
process are conscious. If Jasper was still consciously deliberating even while he pressed the 
button, which I expect he would, then it would have been wrong to block alternative possibilities 
then. Ultimately, instead of dividing up these processes temporally, like if one occurs, and then 
the other in a linear order, we should divide the particular neural pathways involved in either 
conscious deliberation or unconscious pre-motor preparation. If we block alternative possibilities 
through highly localized lesions in the latter pathways, then I would agree that we have agreed 
on a place in decision-making when alternative possibilities can be blocked without disrupting 
free will.
controlling indeterMinisM
At this point I will be transitioning into the use of concepts and terminology from the 
field of practical reasoning. As an introduction, I refer back to our earlier discussion of volition. 
Volition is the capacity to make a choice after consideration and deliberation. This alone does 
not seem to describe free will as I define it. It could be argued that the cognitive mechanisms 
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of all voluntary deliberation are hardwired by our biological makeup, but if the process of 
all ‘voluntary action’ is reduced to neural activity that is pre-defined and out of the control of 
our consciousness, then free will, as I define it, does not exist. I suggest that, in order for free 
will to stand a chance, we need to have a way of controlling this activity. We must be able to 
make a choice about what to do, in a way that is not hardwired, which I translate to mean pre-
determined. Thus, we must be able to generate a new option, one that was not presented through 
a strictly causal network. I will sketch how, in essence, this means generating a new motivation 
to act.
The concept of self-generation is central to my theory. Philosophers such as Belageur 
and Kane have engaged in conversation about such an idea, which they’ve called torn decisions 
or self-forming actions. Philosophers debating this component of free will look for an example 
of an instance wherein, given two or more equally compelling options, each with their own 
calculated weight and normative value, we can make a choice to go in one direction or another. 
Libertarians suggest that this choice can be made nondeterministically, which is to say that given 
a set of options an agent can choose one without the decision being determined, or reducible to 
a hardwired mechanism. One of the strongest oppositions to this theory of free will, in which 
we have control over nondeterministic choices, is that such choices would be based on luck 
or chance. One of the largest hurdles that a libertarian perspective must overcome is how an 
agent can have control over indeterminism so that it does not manifest as purely random noise. 
According to Kane’s definition of free will, with which I agree, an agent must have control 
over their decision in a way that is not determined and not random. Thus, free will requires 
indeterminism in order to break free of determinism, but also requires that indeterminism yields 
to some force possessed by an agent in order for it not to be random or, as Balaguer and Kane 
say, in order to have appropriate non-randomness.
In response to these requirements I suggest a theory free will that invokes novelty. 
An agent must be inventive; an agent must be capable of being handed multiple choices and 
inventing a novel response. But how does novelty come about? Is it possible to merely invent 
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something out of thin air? The way that nature arrives that novel events is through random 
mixtures, the worst of which are purged through selection pressure and the best of which are 
promoted. For example, the evolution the new and improved faculties of an organism come 
about through millions of years of genetic variability. Each genetic variant has the opportunity 
to test its advantages or disadvantages against the trials of the environment. Through selection 
pressure, those genetic variations that result in the greatest advantage survive and reproduce. 
Is this how novelty comes about in the brain? Does a brain, in rapid time, generate a series of 
random possibilities so that the agent can merely select which one is best? In this way the brain 
would be a tool that develops random variations of putative neural activity in response to given 
inputs. In order for an agent to have free will, they would then choose which pattern of neural 
activity was best, or most appropriate according to the agent’s moral and practical values. A key 
question is how an agent can have control over these random neural variations, and thus over 
indeterminism, in such a way as to select a “best” option and allow it to precipitate a physical 
response in the body.
What I have said so far doesn’t answer this question because the agent can seemingly 
only make this choice in a deterministic or random way. It is clear enough to see how an agent 
could make this decision through determinism. Given an indeterministic set of putative neural 
responses, the agent would merely invoke a series of rules in order to calculate the optimal 
choice. Ostensibly, these rules would act like selection pressure driving the most advantageous 
output to make the cut and precipitate action. According to a determinist, these rules would start 
as instinctive programs hardwired into the brain, and would be honed over time through trial and 
error. In making mistakes on some occasions, using some rules, and being successful on others, 
using other rules, an agent’s brain would, over time, hone their preferences and beliefs into what 
appears to be a very personal and unique approach to every problem.
However, the determinist argues, in actuality a complex computer could perform the 
same function given the same predetermined rules at the outset and by following through with 
complex calculations and adjustment of rules for these calculations in response to the results. 
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This is called a feedback loop when feedback, the success or mistakes of an action, is provided 
to the system and the system uses a simple, unwavering, hardwired regulatory program to adjust 
the central calculating procedures in order to generate a different, presumably better, response 
on the next try. An example of a feedback loop can be seen when kicking a soccer ball. You 
intend to hit the ball low to the ground and with a straight, powerful trajectory, but instead it lifts 
high in the air and flies over the goal. This represents a mistake in the body’s movement when 
kicking, and thus a fault with the calculations the brain made when planning the strike. Seeing 
the ball clear the crossbar by 20 feet, the feedback, which tells you that you have to adjust to hit 
the ball lower, your brain changes the way in which it calculates the next strike. You retrieve the 
ball, and try again, this time with your brain programming the body to lean over the ball more. 
You successfully drill the shot straight, low, and with great speed. Observing the success of 
your correction, another form of feedback, your brain initiates memory of the new program and, 
through repeated practice, will be able to enact the appropriate program in the future.
The vast complexity of this trial and error, which takes place constantly all day every 
day, would be the basis for an illusion that an agent’s rules are personal and unique, which would 
confirm their basis in free will. However, if we can reduce the seemingly free willed soccer 
practice session to a complex feedback loop with prescribed calculations, tolerance levels, 
corrections, etc occurring in your brain, then we can also trace the origins of every program that 
was used to the inchoate, hardwired programs you were born with, which were modified to the 
point they are now by trial and error feedback in the environment. Free will as I define it requires 
an additional feature of intention, in which an agent has conscious, meta-regulatory control over 
changes in her programming. Otherwise, it is relatively straightforward, though admittedly not 
easy, to argue that our perception of ourselves as free willing agents is an illusion.
Therefore, as agents with free will, not only must we be inventive, we must have control 
over the rules of the game. Instead of being motivated toward one choice or another by rules 
derived from predetermined instincts honed by reducible feedback loops, we must have the 
capacity to generate new rules for our mental calculations, which I refer to as new motivations. 
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I do not define a new motivation as one which has never been created prior, but rather as 
something of which we are the sole origin. Of course, even a free willing agent cannot decide 
to pursue a new motivation that defies the laws of physics; we cannot simply fly because we 
have the motivation to do so. By novel motivation I do not even suggest that the eventual choice 
can be distinguished from what it would have been had we pursued an automatic instinct. The 
generation of a novel motivation is merely the amendment of the current rules dictating what 
we are motivated to do (how calculations should be made), and why we are motivated to do it 
(how these calculations can be applied to present and other decisions). This is to say that the 
generation of a novel motivation involves a change in our intentions as well as that which we 
find normative so that we may be compelled to take one course of action and not another.
Consider the case of a simple choice that displays the complexity of motivations that can 
inspire a seemingly simple decision. One morning you are given the choice of orange juice or 
coffee to drink. Most mornings you have coffee, but on this occasion, for whatever reason, you 
are confronted with two choices, to maintain your coffee habit, or to try something new. You 
could have a range of reasons for performing either action. You may take the coffee because you 
have learned from past experiences that coffee wakes you up more. On the other hand, you may 
be in the mood to switch things up and try the orange juice. Or you may feel embarrassed, for 
whatever reason, to make one choice. Or perhaps there is very little coffee left, so you take the 
juice so others can have coffee if they so prefer. Maybe you even know that a certain person will 
want coffee, so instead of being impartially altruistic, you’re selectively considering one person. 
Maybe this condition is not entirely selfless, but may curry the favor of this person to your 
benefit. My point is: the variety of motivations driving any one of the choices is extensive.
While the original components of our motivations can be logically reduced, you will see 
that, in the end, we have the ability, when making freely willed decisions, to wield indeterminism 
in a way that invents novel variations of those reducible components as a set of options. This 
indeterminism breaks the chain of determinism. Suddenly, possibilities enter the picture that 
could not have been 100% anticipated, even if we knew everything about the agent leading up to 
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this point. It breaks the need for all decisions to be hardwired and predictable (though they may 
still end up aligning with what may have been hardwired and predictable). Now we need a way 
to control the set of randomized options.  I suggest that meta-regulatory elements in our brain, 
which is our consciousness at work, choose the motivation that suits us from this pool.
We must be careful to remember that in free will there is a component of determinism. 
The precise mechanism of the decision proceeds through a causal mechanism that weighs how 
much a choice stands up to requirements for a “good decision.” The choice that is best according 
to our requirements, or our principles, is allowed to precipitate action. This is not a facet of free 
will that I grudgingly admit to, the determinist argument does not win more ground because I 
admit there are components of determinism. I suggest that determinism grants free will more 
strength by linking our reasons to our actions. If the process of performing an action based on 
a reason was not deterministically causal, there would be no reason to claim we have control 
over our reasons, because we wouldn’t be sure that they caused the appropriate action anyway. 
Indeed, as Kant writes, the will is a causality, so “freedom is by no means lawless” (65, for 
beck). Korsgaard provides some commentary on this subject as well, pointing out both the 
causal and the non-causal elements of free will: “Since the will is practical reason, it cannot be 
conceived as acting and choosing for no reason. Since reasons are derived from principles, free 
will must have a principle. But because the will is free, no law or principle can be imposed upon 
it from the outside. Kant concludes that the will must be autonomous: that is, it must have its 
own law or principle” (93-94). Thus, I claim that while the calculations themselves are causal, 
thereby linking our reasons to our actions, the way in which we calculate is through principles, 
what I call rules, that are our own.
Thus, an agent’s consciousness uses meta-level regulatory mechanisms in the brain to 
change the rules of the game, to alter why we are compelled one way or another, to alter what it 
is that motivates us in that moment as an agent and not as a machine that merely responds in the 
way it should given feedback-honed hardwiring. By consciously changing the rules we change 
the way our brain calculates weight, and therefore influences the decision-making pathway 
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through our free will.
conscious control
As I have said, consciousness controls the way our brain calculates the value of things we 
consider when making a choice. In other words, our consciousness dictates what motivates us, 
and these motivations inform our brain to assign more or less weight to specific considerations 
we have in order to sway our decision-making toward the choice that represents our normativity, 
or that which compels us. Importantly, I believe that the phenomenology of consciousness, the 
experience of it (not the mechanisms themselves but how they feel to us), is vital to this process. 
In Chapter 3 I will outline how the phenomenology of an agent’s consciousness has control 
over regulatory mechanisms in the brain, which dictates the structure of our decision making, 
as well as how current neuroscience supports this claim. Here, I will discuss what it means, 
philosophically, for the phenomenology of consciousness to have this control.
One major implication is in distinguishing between conscious and unconscious free will. 
If the phenomenology of consciousness is required to control our regulatory mechanisms, then 
this would suggest that unconscious decision-making is lacking in free will. The vast majority of 
our decisions are unconscious, which means that the vast majority of our actions are generated 
unconsciously. This would leave us to suppose that a majority of what we say and do is not the 
subject of our free will and therefore not something we are morally responsible for saying or 
doing. I propose that many unconscious decisions are based on the motivations that have already 
been endorsed by our consciousness. Essentially, our unconscious decisions are an extension of 
our conscious ones.
“Trying Not To Try” is a recent book by Edward Slingerland in which he documents the 
concept of wu-wei (oo-way) throughout ancient Chinese philosophy, and relates it to findings 
in modern cognitive science. Wu-wei is a state of effortless or spontaneous action, which is 
complex activity we perform without being entirely aware of it. Some people might experience 
52
wu-wei when cooking, for example, when you gracefully combine a series of ingredients, 
focusing on multiple things cooking at once, and it magically comes together. Perhaps you’re a 
gardener and can relate to those moments when you ‘wake up’ and realize you’ve weeded the 
whole garden, or a writer and you’re familiar with those times when you ‘wake up’ and find that 
it has grown dark outside and ten pages of beautiful prose have leapt out of your fingers. Those 
times of thoughtless, effortless activity are called wu-wei. Athletes commonly encounter this 
state in the intense moments during a match when they stop over-thinking their actions, allow 
their instincts to kick in, and they perform better than normal.
Over-thinking is a key word in this philosophy. Several schools of ancient chinese 
thought held that trying too hard, consciously, was counterproductive, and that letting go and 
trying not to try, so to speak, was the best way to achieve a state of contentment and productivity. 
Slingerland distinguishes between what he calls hot cognition, which is our unconscious mind, 
and cold cognition, which is our conscious mind. What is interesting is that wu-wei, a desirable 
state wherein we acquire a robust charisma and sense of power, or authority, is achieved through 
the submission of our cold cognition, consciousness, to our hot cognition, unconsciousness. 
Not only is a majority of our decision-making unconscious, but now submitting to unconscious 
decision-making seems to be encouraged! How is free will relevant if the our cold, conscious 
cognition is pushed so far on the back burner?
Well, both the ancients and modern cognitive scientists advocate for a period of training 
and calibrating. It is widely accepted that we shouldn’t just act on our every instinctual desire. A 
couple of the ancient chinese schools of thought (eg Confucianists and some Daoists) believed 
that we had to cultivate our hot cognition in some way. Strictly Confucian thought held that 
a strict regimen over a long period of time would carve our unconscious mind enough for us 
to leave the majority of our activities to spontaneous action. Less conservative Confucianists 
following Mencius believed in a more liberal, but definitively cultivating approach, which 
involved training and care until we could reach a desirable state. More conservative Daoists led 
by Zhuangzi believed in going with the flow, but after having selected a set of values that we 
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wish to pursue. What all these philosophies have in common is that they seek to train the hot 
cognition to act in a desirable way automatically so that our cold cognition, which is slower and 
less efficient, can take the back seat during wu-wei. Equally so, all of these philosophies imply 
the need to choose a value-set that we either entrain, or hope to follow. This has to be done by 
the cold, conscious mind beforehand.
Part of what this book points out is: if it is the case that our unconscious mind can 
handle matters just fine on its own, then why do we have big, bulky, slow, and inefficient 
consciousness? This question complements a similar question about why we bothered to evolve a 
phenomenological aspect of consciousness if it has no direct causal role in our behaviors. Much 
like what we saw with Wegner, one answer is that phenomenological consciousness is a tool that 
the brain, not us, not our conscious self, uses to model other minds, and as a metric for how good 
or bad an action may be. Slingerland discusses the theories in cognitive science that suggest a 
role of consciousness in modelling other minds in a way our unconscious mind cannot:
Our unconscious minds are very good at quickly detecting agency, identifying threats 
in our environment, and reading emotions in faces. Only our conscious processes, 
however, seem capable of complex modeling of other minds. Consciousness creates 
a virtual representation of the internal thoughts of others so that we can figure out 
how to interact with them… (59).
Additionally, Slingerland mentions how “the virtual world of consciousness is also where we get 
to practice things without actually having to do them… this helps to make the artificial, novel 
movements involved more fluent and effective” (59).
Slingerland is not a philosopher of free will, nor does he try to make a statement about 
free will, so I will not be critiquing him. Rather, I want to display a fascinating example of 
how convergent theory from ancient philosophies to modern cognitive science supports the 
heretofore uninvestigated importance of the unconscious mind, but still supports the need for our 
consciousness to act as a referee. It is the conscious mind that is making choices with free will 
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and modifying the way our unconscious mind approaches decision making. This process, I claim, 
is tantamount to our unconscious decisions being freely willed as we have a substantial measure 
of control over modifying them to fit our personal moral beliefs.
It could be argued that I am overestimating the impact of consciousness on our day to day 
activities. Quite often our intentions seem to elude us, though we still feel that we are responsible 
for our actions. Many of us will feel culpable for something we did in the throes of passion, like 
yelling at our closest friend because we’re in a bad mood. Why do we still feel responsible?  
Because a bad mood shouldn’t have control over us? Because we could have chosen to overcome 
that problem and not let it overwhelm us? These rationalizations are based in conscious decisions 
we’ve made. We may not explicitly say to ourselves: “I identify as someone who does not allow 
my emotions over a problem to hurt people who had nothing to do with said problem, therefore 
I think it is wrong to harangue my friends when I am in a bad mood.” Such over-analytical self-
awareness is probably just a symptom of being a philosopher, and is not requisite for being a 
regular human being.
However, even if we do not have the same terminology and cohesive, rational thought, 
of which that quote would be an exemplar, we still go through these logical steps, and I would 
say that we do so consciously. At some point prior to yelling at our friend, we have made the 
conscious decision that that is something we feel is wrong. Maybe we saw someone in a movie 
behave that way and we thought it was wrong. Maybe someone did the same thing to us and 
we committed ourselves to never being like that. Deciding that we feel something is right and 
something else is wrong, or, more simply, that we like one thing and not another, is entirely 
satisfactory for establishing an identity and endorsing requisite values, and regulating our 
behavior (conscious and unconscious) through a robust mechanism of free will.
We are still pestered by the findings of cognitive scientists that a majority of our decision 
making is unconcious. Some figures rise as high as 99% of our activity being mediated through 
unconscious decisions. For one thing, this is slightly misleading as it includes unconscious 
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control over such things as heartbeat, breathing, moving our fingers in the precise way it needs 
in order to type these words, walking in a straight line while also navigating around that person 
who is moving slowly ahead. The amount of neural activity needed to regulate our day to day 
activities requires that a great deal of it occur automatically through highly efficient, machine-
like processing in our brain. Otherwise, we would be too distracted by menial tasks to be able 
to execute long term planning and moral decision making, which probably evolved because 
they have an essential, and irreplaceable impact our livelihood (how much others like and will 
cooperate with us, how many extra resources we can secure without exerting so much energy, 
etc.). For decisions that are morally relevant, or related to our long term goals, a much higher 
percentage is conscious. Not all, but much more. And really, this still makes sense as a balanced 
structure for conscious and unconscious activity.
Granted the case that only a small percentage of our decisions are conscious, I believe 
this still leaves quite a bit of room for what we would consider thorough application of free 
will. Let’s say 10% of our decision-making is conscious and therefore capable of being directly 
controlled by free will. This is like saying that for every hundred days we spend making 
decisions, ten of them are spent figuring out exactly how we want to make these decisions. The 
remaining ninety days are spent executing our decisions based on those rules we decided upon. 
Ten days is a lot of time to decide what we think is right and wrong. It’s important to distinguish 
between deciding what we think is right and wrong in the moment (as a kind of gut reaction, but 
one which we consciously endorse), and deciding what we think is right and wrong in the most 
optimal sense. People spend their entire lives being philosophers, lawmakers, and policymakers 
in order to find the ‘most optimal option’ for what is right and wrong. However, we don’t need a 
‘most optimal option’ in order to have an opinion about what is right and wrong. In the moment, 
I might think that I am perfectly justified in yelling at my friend simply because I’m in a bad 
mood. In that moment I might think that expressing my anger is better than not doing so. Given 
enough time I may decide the opposite, that succumbing to that anger only made the problem 
worse.
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Thus, we can decide right and wrong, in a way that is entirely mediated by our free will, 
rapidly. Even if only 10% of our actions are mediated by those moments when we first decide 
how we feel about something (like when we first encounter someone wearing a green suit, or see 
a parent pushing their child to get them somewhere they have to be), it becomes clear that the 
number of things we endorse as right or wrong during that 10% can certainly account for all our 
subsequent actions. It only takes an instant to have a true gut reaction, and probably not much 
longer to decide on a temporary moral position. It’s a lot like riding a bike, we spend a couple 
weeks learning and then we are able to ride for the rest of our lives. In that sense free will is like 
muscle memory; we only need a short period of concentration to master a certain level of skill 
that we can continue to execute thoughtlessly for a long time. This doesn’t mean that we will 
become internationally renowned cyclists in a couple weeks, or revered fonts of moral wisdom 
in ten days. That kind of mastery takes years and years of practice. On the other hand, humans 
have an amazing capacity for memory. I suggest that we use this memory to store our conscious 
decisions in a way that can be accessed later without necessarily requiring our conscious 
endorsement. Indeed, we don’t need our conscious endorsement because we already had it when 
we endorsed it in the first place.
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chApter 3
the neuroscIence of free wIll
So far I have outlined some positions on free will and made my own claim from the 
stance of practical reasoning. Here I will show how I find current neuroscience can support my 
position. Additionally, I will try to highlight how and why my interpretation of contemporary 
scientific theory differs from the central perspective from leading scientists and philosophers, 
who most often chock up free will to an illusion.
First, let’s review my position. What does free will mean? Free will is the ability to make 
a choice without external influence. A choice is an option for action that we select from a set of 
alternatives. The basis of this selection must exist in a decision-making pathway that can exist 
on its own, which is to say, without being determined by the events, what I’ve called external 
influence, leading up to it. By external influence I mean anything that has happened prior to a 
state that has exclusive, causal influence on the eventual result of a choice. Free will does not 
rely on such a mechanism. Free will constitutes a choice that is self-generated. A freely willed 
decision can never be fully predicted because it has no deterministic analog, which means that 
there is no antecedent state that has, according to a defined law of physics, determined the 
subsequent existence of the choice state. Free will does not require intrinsic programs that are 
hardwired in our brain, otherwise it is determined by a program that relies on antecedent states 
that directly, and therefore predictably, cause future states.
Now, the goal of this chapter is to place that proposal into a scientific context. Here’s 
one attempt at explaining decision-making. We encounter something, and we receive sensory 
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information about it (e.g. the shape, color, smell, movement etc of an object, or of someone’s 
face in response to something we say). When we perceive it the sensory information gets 
processed in various areas of the brain according to the modality (e.g. touch, taste, smell, sight, 
sound) or the valence (i.e. what kind of attention is needed). Processing alerts parts of the brain 
that are required to decide how to respond. Several patterns of neural activity, which represent 
possible reactions, get some traction and whichever presents with the most support, and therefore 
has the highest sway, is selected to precipitate activity in pre-motor areas that are in charge of 
designing the response and executing the excitation of relevant motor areas.
This scientific model is the simplistic “sense-think-act” cycle that is the groundwork of 
the roboticist perspective. Roboticists are the eliminitive incompatibilists of the lab. In his book, 
“Mental Biology: A New Science of How the Mind and Brain Relate,” lifelong neuroscientist 
W.R. Klemm defines roboticists as those scientists and philosophers whose position “requires 
the assumption that humans are biologically programmed robots… that our brains have been 
programmed by our genetic endowment and by past experience–thus, the conclusion follows that 
we are biological robots” (172-173). In essence, the roboticist belief is that (a) the activities of 
the brain are reducible to matter that makes it up (cells, subcellular organelles, molecules, and 
all the way down to the particle physics of atoms), and (b) that the structure and function of the 
matter in our brain, at all levels, is reducible to hardwired mechanisms and direct stimulation 
from the outside world. While a roboticist might accept that there is a degree of uncertainty, or 
indeterminism, when you get down to the quantum level, they would suggest that this would 
only modify their claim if it turned out that activity in the brain is thereby random. Nonetheless, 
whether determined or random, choice would still be outside the grip of anything like free will.
Before moving forward, I should take some time to discuss the physics of indeterminism 
at the quantum level. What do I mean when I use the term quantum uncertainty? Such phrases 
like “quantum uncertainty”, or “Heisenberg’s principle” may strike fear in our hearts, but it is 
not necessary to understand the complexity of the topic in full. I will endeavor to summarize the 
relevant material so that we can understand quantum indeterminism, and how it plays a role in 
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the capacity for free will. In 1927, German physicist Werner Heisenberg introduced his principle 
of quantum uncertainty, which suggested that the more we know about one quality of a particle, 
such as its location in space, the less we can know about other qualities of that particle, such as 
its momentum. This is to say that there is ultimately a limit to what we can know about a particle. 
Imagine you’re watching a film at the theater but the screen is very dim so that you can barely 
make out what’s happening. The attendant tries to correct the error, and successfully brightens 
the image, but simultaneously, the sound dies out so we can’t understand what’s being said, even 
if we can see people talking. This helps us to understand the way in which quantum states are 
measurable. One question we may ask, however, is whether this limit is epistemological, bound 
by insufficient technology, or ontological, an intrinsic fact of nature?
Originally, Heisenberg attributed some uncertainty to what’s called the “measurement-
disturbance relationship” wherein the act of measuring a particle changed the quantum state. As 
such, we can not ascertain the precise state of a particle. Some recent studies have been finding 
that the measurement-disturbance relationship doesn’t account for as much uncertainty as was 
previously thought (Rozema et al., 2012). However, the team still notes that “in the end, there’s 
no way you can know [both quantum states] accurately at the same time,” which supports the 
fundamental aspect of the principle of quantum uncertainty, which purports to describe an 
intrinsic aspect of nature that cannot be known.
Why can’t it be known? The reason for this is that these qualities of a particle are 
seemingly indeterministic. They follow no definable laws of deterministic physics that we know. 
They behave randomly. There are clouds of probability wherein a particle may reside, or ranges 
of momentum the particle may have, but where precisely in the cloud or in the range the particle 
may be is a matter of chance. Thus, quantum uncertainty, uncertainty about the quantum state of 
a particle, renders physical systems indeterminate, at least at a small scale. Given the success of 
quantum mechanics in displaying this indeterminate nature of particle physics, we are confronted 
by two problems for free will. First, how can this indeterminacy have an effect on such a large, 
complex system as the brain without being entirely superseded? How could quantum states really 
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have a meaningful effect on atomic structure and activity, let alone molecules, cells, circuits, and 
networks that eventually conglomerate into a single brain? Second, even if there were a way in 
which quantum uncertainty could translate on a larger scale to the brain, how can we exert free 
will in a way that controls randomness, but isn’t determined? In other words, how can there be 
a middle ground between random, uncontrollable indeterminism, and pre-ordained, predictable 
determinism?
These questions will take some time to even begin to answer here, not to mention the 
time it will take for us to really develop sufficient empirical (or even theoretical) support for a 
middle ground. In this chapter I seek to support the plausibility of this middle ground given our 
current understanding of physics and neuroscience, and how science and philosophy can team up 
to explore these avenues moving forward. To be clear, I am not attempting to prove the existence 
of free will with our current evidence. Instead I am supporting the idea that it is an open scientific 
and philosophical question, that it has not been disproven, and that it is plausible that we may 
find an explanation in the direction of a middle ground between indeterminism and determinism
For now, let us endeavor to answer these questions by returning to the “sense-think-act” 
cycle. Philosopher and cognitive scientist Andy Clark, in “Mindware: An Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Cognitive Science”, writes that this cycle is supported by roboticists who suggest 
that there is “a simple division of labor in which perceptual processing yields a rich, detailed 
inner representation of the 3D visual scene, which is then given as input to the reasoning and 
planning centers, which in turn calculate a course of action and send commands to the motor 
effectors” (88). In this cycle we see the kind of distinction between deliberation and the decision 
that was assumed by McKenna’s thought experiment.
It has become clear that this simplification is not true in many ways, a couple of which 
relate to problems with McKenna’s model of the decision-making pathway. According to the 
roboticist model, and according to what McKenna implies to be a model for cognition, there is 
a period of deliberation and then a final, cumulative decision, which then initiates action. More 
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recent findings suggest that this cycle ignores the interactive quality of this cycle wherein, as 
Clark summarizes:
1. Daily agent-environment interactions seem not to depend on the construction and use 
of detailed inner models of the full 3D scene.
2. Low-level perception may “call” motor routines that yield better perceptual input and 
hence improve information pick-up.
3. Real-world actions may sometimes play an important role in the computational process 
itself.
4. The internal representation of worldly events and structures may be less like a passive 
data structure or description and more like a direct recipe for action (88).
As such, what Clark calls a “compelling hypothesis” is the new model which suggests that “the 
visual system is not even attempting to build a rich, detailed model of the current scene, but is 
instead geared to using frequent saccades to retrieve information as and when it is needed for 
some specific problem-solving purpose” (91). All of this means that decision-making is not 
really a straightforward cycle. It can be more accurately described as an interactive system that 
monitors its progress, adjusts to specific demands, and always regulates the computations it 
performs, even after the “decision” is made by processing centers.
What does this mean for my philosophical claims? This suggests that I was right to 
question the conclusions McKenna draws based on his thought experiment. The act of decision 
making is too complex for us to be able to say that the lesion in Jasper’s brain played no role in 
his final decision, perhaps he could have done otherwise. It isn’t possible to defend Frankfurt’s 
objection to alternative possibilities by selectively limiting alternative possibilities at the 
“moment of decision” instead of for all deliberation, because decision-making and deliberation 
are intertwined, and may even be identical processes for some decisions, as Clark’s point number 
four above addressed. The remaining features of the interactive hypothesis clearly establishes 
the complexity of the decision-making process. Now, such a complex process, with numerous 
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variables that need to be controlled constantly, comprehensively, and with some degree of 
consistency, needs to be under control. Much like businesses, governments, or individual tasks, 
the bigger, or the more complex our decision-making process becomes, the more need there is 
for a meta-regulatory network to oversee the completion of deliberation and choice. This opens 
the door for conscious intervention on the whole causal pathway of decision-making.
Many books on the topic of consciousness are at some point confronted by the same 
question: if phenomenological consciousness plays no role in the causal pathway of decision 
making, then what on earth is it for? We know that consciousness is clunky, time-consuming, 
and inefficient in comparison to the unconsciousness. This is why so much of our lives is run 
by unconscious elements of our brain; if we had to keep track of every heartbeat, every breath, 
every step, every movement of our mouth to articulate a word, so on, we would be incredibly 
overwhelmed. We wouldn’t be able to handle it, and there would be no time for sports, or love, or 
philosophy. Why, then, would we have evolved to have such a rich phenomenological experience 
if it did not impact our decision making in some way? Why, when our unconscious mind seems 
fully capable of controlling all aspects of our basic life, as recent research is showing, do we 
have this inefficient, and ultimately inconsequential experience?
“A Brief Tour of Human Consciousness” is V. S. Ramachandran’s analysis on the topic 
of the mind, both conscious and unconscious. In his exploration of Libet’s experiments, which 
we have discussed earlier (where it was found that the feeling of willing something occurs 
after the initiation of relevant activities in the brain), Ramachandran is confronted by this why 
question: “Why might this be happening? What might the evolutionary rationale be? … If the 
subjective sensation of willing is like a shadow that accompanies us as we move but is not causal 
in making us move, then why would evolution bother delaying the signal so that it coincides 
with our movement?” (88-89). He suggests that the delay of conscious experience from the 
initiation of relevant brain activity may have developed so that the sensation of willing an action 
would “coincide not with the onset of the brain commands but with the actual execution of the 
command by your finger” (88).
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From a cognitive science perspective, this makes sense as there needs to be consistent, 
temporal contingency between two events in order for humans to suspect that they are causally 
related. As we saw with Wegner’s tree branch example, if a tree branch moves exactly as we 
imagine, at the same time as we imagine it will move, and does so consistently, then, and almost 
only then, is it relatively easy to think that we caused it to move. Likewise, if our feeling of 
willing our action was not temporally proximal to the action itself, then perhaps we wouldn’t feel 
so strongly that we had willed it. Imagine if we thought about moving our finger, and it happens 
almost a full second later. Imagine now that all our actions come with this delay, while we might 
get used to it, it may not convince us that there is an unimpeachable causal link.
It could be argued that that this means nothing about whether or not this feeling of willing 
is causal. It’s just something our brain makes us experience in order to, perhaps, inform future 
decisions that the brain makes for us. The same can be said in the other direction: if it’s just 
a matter of our brain trying to give us the experience of willing, then it stands to reason that, 
instead of delaying the signal to the time of action, the brain could have evolved a different 
capacity for the feeling of contingency such that we would still have the sensation of willing 
even if the awareness occurred without delay, well before the action. In other words, why come 
up with the contraption of delayed experience instead of more liberal contingency? Would a 
more liberal sense of contingency alter our feeling of control over events in our environment? It’s 
possible, but if the contingency were to be a small range at the exact time when action occurs, 
then it’s unlikely any environmental event would consistently fall within that range.
Ramachandran identifies a paradox in Libet’s findings, which stems from our intuitive 
understanding of causation:
On the one hand, the experiment shows that free will is illusory: it cannot be causing 
the brain events because the events kick in a second earlier. But on the other hand, 
the delay must have some function, otherwise why would the delay have evolved? 
Yet if it does have a function, what could it be other than moving (in this case) the 
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finger? (89)
He notes the intuitive conclusion from Libet’s experiments (that free will is an illusion), but also 
points out that there must be a functional purpose in the precise delay of the feeling of willing. 
It had to occur closer to the event to be contingent, but not too close, otherwise we wouldn’t 
draw the intuitive conclusion that our will must have caused the action because that which 
comes first would cause the latter event. He concludes that “perhaps our very notion of causation 
requires a radical revision… as happened in quantum mechanics” (89), which strongly supports 
the direction that my philosophical claim has taken, suggesting that a specific amplification of 
quantum uncertainty introduces a non-deterministic quality to decision making, which could 
solve this paradox.
It may seem like the only solution is to find a way that the universe can function wherein 
events can cause their antecedent events (B can cause A even though it occurs later temporally). 
This sounds like a demand for a time traveling solution; event B must be able to inflict causation 
backwards in time, or something crazy like that. Now, it may be the case that time is not linear, 
that causation may have a completely different temporal profile than we expect, but this is not the 
necessary revision to our notion of causation that is required to solve this paradox.
In his attempt at a solution, Ramachandran connects matter in the brain to qualia, or 
phenomenological experiences like “the redness of red, the flavor of Marmite or paneer tikka 
masala or wine” (96). To start off, he says that qualia “must have evolved to fulfill a specific 
biological function–they cannot be mere by-products (an “epiphenomenon”) of neural activity” 
(98). But what is the biological relevance, and how does it support the notion of free will? 
Ramachandran writes that:
Sensory representations that are themselves devoid of qualia might acquire qualia in 
the process of being economically encoded or “prepared” into manageable chunks 
as they are delivered to a central executive structure higher up in the brain. The 
result is a higher order representation that serves new computational goals (98-99).
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To some extent it can be argued that the biological purpose might just be to create an experience 
as a tool to better compute a decision. The idea that the brain is creating this sensation for itself 
to feel, instead of us, as agents, experiencing it, seems to degrade any chance at reserving free 
will, but some philosophers have found ways to argue from this structure that Ramachandran 
describes that there is free will.
This brings us to Dennett’s narrative consciousness philosophy, which is supported 
and excellently described by Andy Clark. He writes that Dennett’s idea is that “a system has 
a belief just in case its behavior is well predicted by treating it as a behavior” (178), which is 
called the “Intentional Stance” of consciousness. The brain is considered “the locus of multiple, 
quasi-independent processing streams. There is no single, ultimate judgement issued by the 
brain in response to an input–no decisive moment in space or time where the system settles on a 
unique definitive content fixing the conscious state” (178). As such, Dennett writes in his book 
“Consciousness Explained” that consciousness is a constant narrative that is “not anything we 
are born with, not part of our innate hard-writing, but in surprisingly large measure, an artifact of 
our immersion in human culture” (346). This organization allows us to make “cognitive objects 
of our own thought processes and to weave a kind of on-going narrative (about who we are, 
and what we are doing, and why we are doing it) that artificially “fixes” the cognitive contents” 
(Clark, 179).
Personally, I don’t know how to feel reassured by this philosophy of self, and of free will 
as a sensation requisite of this narrative self. This concept is asserting that all our experiences 
of agency, of beliefs, of self, are complex narratives that our brain conjures for us. Imperatively, 
the “for us” is not ‘us’, as in our phenomenological experience of ourselves, but ‘us’ as in our 
brain. This illusionary narrative is not generated for the benefit of some small, weak agent to 
watch like a movie, the agent is the movie that the brain is watching, presumably as a monitor to 
better inform itself about how to proceed in its day to day activities of determining everything 
our bodies do and everything we will feel subsequently. This makes experience feel like a tool 
for our brain to monitor its progress, which disagrees with my definition of free will. While 
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the narrative is self-generated, Dennett’s claim is that the self is our unconscious body, which, 
without a causal conscious influence, can only be shaped by the factors outside of our control. In 
the next chapter I will provide evidence that this is not true.
Returning to Ramachandran, he continues to describe this structure of consciousness, but 
takes a slightly different approach. Recall that he has established the existence of “a higher order 
representation that serves new computational goals.” He expands on this representation and says:
Let us call this second, higher-order, representation a meta-representation… One 
could think of this meta-representation as a second “parasitic” brain–or at least a set 
of processes–that has evolved in us humans to create a more economical description 
of the rather more automatic processes that are being carried out in the first brain. 
Ironically, this idea implies that the so-called homunculus fallacy–the notion of a 
“little man in the brain watching a movie screen filled with qualia”– isn’t really a 
fallacy (99).
So far, he seems to be describing a similar scenario of a brain that creates a movie-like narrative 
for another part of the brain to watch. However, Ramachandran elaborates on the concept of 
the homunculus in a way that suggests not that it is generated by meta-regulatory activity, but 
that the homunculus generates the activity itself, or at least that they are one and the same. 
As he writes: “I suggest that the homunculus is simply either the metarepresentation itself, or 
another brain structure that emerged later in evolution for creating meta-representations… it 
doesn’t have to be a single new structure–it could be a set of novel functions that involves a 
distributed network,” which then “serves to emphasize or highlight certain aspects of the first 
[representation] in order to create tokens that facilitate novel styles of subsequent computations, 
either for internally juggling symbols sequentially (“thought”) or for communicating ideas to 
others through a one-dimensional sound stream (“language”)” (99-100).
This direction of thought takes us closer to what I conceive to be a new model of 
cognition that supports the existence of free will. I proposed in Chapter 2 that we are capable 
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of self-generating motivation. What I meant by that is that free willing agents are capable of 
altering events in their brains in order to favor one set of calculations over another, and thus to 
favor one decision over another. The change of calculations is a change in motivations. In terms 
of practical reasoning, we generate new motivations by creating new reasons to act one way and 
not another. In order to achieve this we select a new way of calculating what decision to make. 
The action of calculating, in brief, consists of neurons firing and activating each other in a pattern 
that initiates later activity, which eventually will result in activity in motor areas that stimulate 
bodily responses. This mechanism proceeds deterministically, otherwise there would be a disjoint 
between what decisions cause which actions, and this would be biologically disastrous.
However, the question of free will arises earlier. In Chapter 2, I proposed that free will 
is the ability to change which parameters are important for these calculation; free will is the 
ability to change the rules, and it must proceed on a middle ground between determinism and 
indeterminism. For more scientific support of this claim, I will turn first to Peter Tse for a view 
of free will at the level of the synapse, the communicative connections between neurons, then I 
will refer back to Klemm for a view of free will at the level of meta-regulation, which will bring 
together the effects at the small level of the synapse to display how consciousness exerts brain-
wide control over neural events, thereby exercising free will over choices and actions.
synaPtic Free Will
“The Neural Basis of Free Will” is Dartmouth professor of cognitive neuroscience 
Peter Tse’s unprecedented attempt to answer the free will question by looking at the activities 
of individual and small groups of neurons. Through careful analysis of the physics, chemistry, 
physiology, molecular biology and computational aspects of the brain, he finds that a strong free 
will, much like I have defined, is not only plausible, but empirically verifiable. In the following 
section I will distill the many components of his argument to a concise explanation of how 
indeterminism enables free will. I will also attempt to convince the reader that this scientific 
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proposal supports precisely my philosophic claim that free will constitutes self-generated 
motivation.
Tse argues that his philosophy of free will applies regardless of whether we accept or 
deny indeterminism. However, he generally assumes that the universe has been found to be at 
least sufficiently indeterministic for a “strong free will” to exist, because it supports the fact that 
“things really could have turned out otherwise” (2.1). As we have seen, there has been some 
confusion about whether observed indeterminism was an issue with our method of measurement 
or an ontological reality. As Tse points out, “determinists are loath to give up the idea that 
unmeasured properties nonetheless occupy a definite state at each moment,” (A1.6) which is to 
say that determinists support the idea that unmeasured quantum states of a particle still exist in 
a set form, they are just inaccessible. Imagine you’ve walked into a dark room without lights. 
You use a flashlight to determine first the location of one wall, and then the wall opposite to it. 
You can’t see both clearly at the same time. The determinists argue that, regardless of which 
wall you’re looking at, the other exists in a set location. Of course, this is the most intuitive 
understanding of the universe, but indeterminism suggests that at the quantum level, the precise 
qualities of quantum states, like the nature and location of the opposite wall, are not set, they do 
not “occupy a definite state at each moment”.
Tse also writes that many determinists have tried to suggest a variety of complex 
alternatives to quantum indeterminism, but ultimately “there is no need to invoke quantum 
nonlocality, superposition, entanglement, coherence, tunneling, quantum gravity, or any new 
forces to understand informational causal chains in the brain” (A1.8). He writes that some of 
these theories are inapplicable because they require circumstances that are physiologically 
irrelevant (“the brain is, simply put, too “warm” to support this kind of quantum-domain 
coherence, and synapses are too wide to support electron tunneling”), whereas the rest 
are improbable in comparison to quantum indeterminism (“I doubt that quantum-domain 
effects— beyond the variability in neural dynamics introduced by amplification of microscopic 
fluctuations—are required to account for how information is processed by neurons”).
69
He is careful to note that while indeterminism introduces a kind of gap in the causal 
chain, as Kane has suggested, free will doesn’t require that consciousness “play a necessary 
role in determining which possibility is actualized,” which may sometimes seem unlikely, but 
rather that “consciousness, and the entertainment of possible scenarios and courses of action in 
working memory, plays a role in changing the criteria for firing on neurons that might lead to 
future mental events” (A1.9, emphasis added). This classification of free will supports what we 
have already discussed wherein consciousness changes the rules of the game in order to influence 
decision-making.
Having established the premise of indeterminism, Tse goes on to acknowledge the 
apparent problem of mental causation. The question is how mental events can change the 
physical substrate that encodes that mental event. “Higher-level facts in the present are realized 
in physical facts in the present. In this regard, any information that is realized in neurons that are 
active now cannot change the physical basis of that information itself. That would be impossible 
circular causation” (2.3). Thus, we know that mental events arise from coded information in 
neuronal activity, but how can you reverse the direction of causation such that the mental event 
influences the activity that created it? Tse writes that we don’t need to reverse the direction:
Neurons do not only make other neurons fire; they also recode the informational 
criteria realized in the physical criteria that will make other neurons fire at some 
unknown time in the future when the right inputs come along. The central thesis 
argued here is that physically realized mental events can change the physical 
basis not of present but rather of future mental events by triggering changes in the 
physical and informational criteria that must be met by future presynaptic inputs 
before future postsynaptic neuronal firing occurs (2.3).
This is a lot to digest, but if we pick apart the terminology the central thesis becomes clear. First 
we will look at how a neuron works, in brief, and then his philosophy of criterial causation, then 
we will pick apart the neuroscience to understand how criterial causation is involved in neural 
70
events on a cell to cell level.
Neurons are cells in the brain that conduct charged ions (e.g. Na+, K+, Cl-, Ca2+) across 
its membrane through ion channels. Cascades of moving ions, such as rapid influx of Na+, 
result in flow of electrical current and changes in membrane voltage, which is the difference in 
electrical potential between the outside and the inside of the cell. These changes can culminate in 
a hyperpolarized (less excited) state, where the difference in potential between the inside and the 
outside of the cell is large, or in a depolarized (excited) state, where the difference is minimized. 
During depolarization, the resting membrane potential rises rapidly until it reaches the reversal 
potential for Na+, and then reverts to a more hyperpolarized state before finally rising to the 
stable resting potential. These changes constitute the rapid influx of Na+ (rising potential) 
followed by rapid efflux (lowering potential), and the slower influx of K+ (the stabilizing increase 
to resting potential).
This spike in potential is called an action potential. It arises at the axon hilloc, between 
the base of the axon and the body of the cell, and is transferred by a chain reaction through the 
axon to the axon terminals. The terminal ends of the axon connect with the dendrites, receptive 
branches, of another cell, forming what’s called a synapse. When the action potential reaches the 
terminal it signals the release of neurotransmitters into the synapse between pre and postsynaptic 
neurons. The neurotransmitters initiate ion flow through ion channels in the postsynaptic neuron, 
which sends signals from the dendrite to the cell body, where the information is processed. If 
input to the cell from the synapses meets a threshold, it initiates an action potential that repeats 
the cycle to stimulate the next cell in a neural circuit.
Criterial causation relates to physical and informational criteria for this neuronal firing. 
In order for a neuron to respond to stimulation in a certain way (i.e. with a spike, or two, or 
not), the stimulation it receives must meet some physical criteria (such as exceeding a threshold 
electrical potential before the cell fires from the axon hilloc) or informational criteria (such as 
what information is mentally realized when the cell is fired). There are two forms of plasticity, 
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synaptic and intrinsic plasticity, that control how much stimulation a postsynaptic cell is capable 
of receiving from a presynaptic neuron, and how a cell’s intrinsic properties integrates synaptic 
input and produces output activity.
Now let’s discuss how criterial causation can fit into a model of neural events. Tse 
suggests a three stage model for criterial causation:
(1) New physical/informational criteria are set in a neuronal circuit on the basis 
of preceding physical/mental processing at time t1, in part via a mechanism of 
rapid synaptic resetting that effectively changes the inputs to a postsynaptic neuron. 
These changes can be driven either volitionally or nonvolitionally, depending on 
the neural circuitry involved.
(2) At time t2, inherently variable inputs arrive at the postsynaptic neuron,
and (3) at time t3 physical/informational criteria are met or not met, leading to 
postsynaptic neural firing or not (2.7).
What Tse is suggesting is that, after a neuron participates in the creation of a mental event 
it adjusts its synaptic and intrinsic criteria for when and how it will respond to future neural 
stimulation events. He doesn’t explicitly refer to intrinsic criterial adjustments because research 
into intrinsic plasticity is less complete, but there is sufficient evidence to show that intrinsic 
plasticity fits right in this model. These adjustments can be mediated by volition, or conscious 
will, or not. After making adjustments, a cell will inevitably receive new stimulation. Depending 
on whether the new criteria are met, the cell will respond a certain way, maybe it will fire, 
maybe not. Tse argues that indeterminism can be involved in the first two stages, but not the last, 
because “intracellular potential either passes the threshold for firing or it does not” (2.7). Tse’s 
model parallels the model I have established as it also defines a period of indeterminacy and the 
stages after which indeterminism is irrelevant and events occur on a deterministic basis.
Now we have the foundation needed to understand Tse’s central thesis: “physically 
realized mental events can change the physical basis not of present but rather of future mental 
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events by triggering changes in the physical and informational criteria that must be met by future 
presynaptic inputs before future postsynaptic neuronal firing occurs”. In other words, after a 
mental event of any magnitude occurs, there is a way for regulatory activity to relay information 
back to the neurons from the mental event originated, and in so doing can influence the 
postsynaptic cell’s criteria for responsiveness to future stimulation by presynaptic events. This 
carefully sidesteps the problem of mental causation, which states that a mental event arising from 
physical substrate cannot modify itself by modifying the physical substrate. But Tse notes that 
his model certainly describes free will because while “there can obviously never be a self-caused 
event… criteria can be set up in advance, such that when they are met, an action automatically 
follows; this is an action that we will have willed to take place by virtue of having set up those 
particular criteria in advance” (7.5).
A remaining question is how a mental event can influence the change of a neuron’s 
physical and informational criteria. Tse holds that, “assuming amplification of microscopic 
fluctuations, criterial causation permits downward mental causation and a strong free will 
because neurons can set up criteria for future action potential release that, once satisfied, lead to 
nondetermined yet self-selected future actions” (2.6). We will discuss amplification further when 
we discuss Klemm, but the point here is how this downward mental causation presents itself. The 
questions that remain are: what is the precise nature of this changing criteria, and how do some 
mental events cause that change in a way that instills free will in the system?
First, the nature of neuronal criterial changes. We need not dive too far into the details 
of complex mechanistic criterial changes, a topic that Tse describes in thorough detail in his 
book (Chapter 5), as it is complex, and not yet fully understood. The strength of the proposal is 
understood well enough by understanding the following, which is only one example of a type of 
neural plasticity that can be involved in criterial causation.
There are a subset of receptors that are located in the membrane of a neuron at the 
synapse called NMDA receptors. NMDA receptors belong to a family of receptors called 
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ionotropic receptors, which are made up of several subunit proteins. These typically four 
subunits line up like a bouquet of proteins with a space between them through which ions can 
pass, like through a channel. In the case of NMDA, the proteins are signalled to open the channel 
when the neurotransmitter glutamate and the amino acid glycine bind to the surface, and when 
the neuron in question is currently depolarizing (being excited, or spiking). When open, the 
channel permits Na+ and Ca2+ to permeate the membrane, enter the cell and further depolarize 
the membrane as well as regulate a variety of features, such as the neurotransmitter release 
subsequent to the cell spiking.
Tse proposes that NMDA receptors can influence future spiking events because they 
control the precise timing and strength of synaptic input, which mediates spike-timing dependent 
plasticity. Spike-timing dependent plasticity refers to how the activity and informational coding 
of a cell will change depending on how it spikes in the wider context of the cells around it and 
the timing of the introduction of a stimulus. If a spike occurs after an upstream event, it fits in 
the causal cycle (wherein an object responds to something that came before it) and cooperates 
with other cells to contribute to the larger response. On the other hand, if the spike time is 
before an upstream event, then it doesn’t fit in the picture and is considered to be unrelated to 
the phenomenon, and therefore only a competitor for attention, not a contributor. Imagine the 
scenario of a basketball game: if someone in the crowd cheers before a shot is taken, they would 
appear out of place, and wouldn’t contribute to a group response. It might appear that they are 
cheering for some other purpose, like the pass preceding the shot, or an email they just received 
telling them they’ve been accepted into a competitive graduate program. If they cheered just after 
a shot, like is normal, then they appear much more coherent with the rest of the crowd.
While this wouldn’t happen in the same way with humans, of course, plasticity among 
neurons, the ability to change connections and individual activity, would result in the exclusion 
and inhibition of cells that spiked before the stimulus, whereas those that spiked together and at 
the “right time” would be welcomed as contributors to a pattern of response. This would shape 
the way cells and the brain as a whole respond moving forward. As Tse writes:
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Over time, such spike timing-dependent weight changes could result in the 
“sculpting” of neural circuits, in which spikes, and the information realized in them, 
are causal of later spikes and information, from level to level in an information-
processing series of stages. Such circuitry allows the encoding and learning of 
information about external causation in terms of changes in synaptic weights and 
the ordering of neuronal firing in a network (5.11).
Relating this back to NMDA receptors, Tse suggests that changes in NMDA receptors can 
reweight the interactions between pre and postsynaptic neurons in such a way as to sculpt 
neuronal circuits to respond to future events (which can be events one second in the future or 
years later) in a way that can be mandated by top down mental causation (free will) and not just 
by deterministic responses of a cell to stimulation.
Since NMDA receptors “can play a role in physically realizing so many of the most 
fundamental properties of information processing in neuronal circuits” (5.25) yet be altered by 
such small atomic events, they effectively amplify quantum level uncertainty to indeterminism 
at the level of the cell. This ability enables NMDA receptors to be a basis for the indeterminism 
that is wielded by higher level processing to produce creative optimization heuristics when 
deliberating. More on that later. Tse writes conclusively that:
NMDA receptors may play at least four important roles in the neuronal basis of 
mental causation: (1) they introduce randomness to the macroscopic domain in 
the form of spike-timing uncertainty, which may then meet or not meet present 
neuronal criteria; (2) they may play some role in an “annealing” process that 
minimizes the chances of getting stuck in local minima of thought or behavior, 
affording the generation of many possible solutions that can meet a set of criteria; 
(3) they may realize rapid synaptic resetting that permits neurons to escape the 
impossibility of self-causation by changing the criteria for firing of neurons on the 
next information-processing cycle; and (4) they transition neural network behavior 
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into a bursting mode that allows for the transfer of bursts as informational packets 
across a network, which, I argue, is the neural basis of attentional binding (5.51).
For now we will focus in on roles 3 and 4, and how they demonstrate a capacity for the brain to 
reweight synaptic responsiveness in a way that controls future output. We will go back to roles 
1 and 2 when discussing how indeterminism initiates a process of creative problem solving in 
order to arrive at potentially novel choices in the face of alternative possibilities.
Tse writes that changes in NMDA receptors can be initiated by back-propagating action 
potentials, which send the signal to dendritic receptors to change. The back-propagation of action 
potentials can be “altered by network inputs that sculpt which branches are ‘active’” and they 
“could be a graded or gain-modulated process that effectively [adds] or [decreases] resistance 
to the passage of an action potential up particular dendritic branches” (5.26). Thus, “network 
inputs” would have control over which and how dendritic branches are able to undergo synaptic 
reweighting. Tse proposes that network inputs could be the encoded information delivered by 
bursting activity (repeated neuronal firing) that is optimized in working memory and mediated by 
endogenous attention.
Endogenous attention and working memory are the core components of Tse’s model 
for top-down mental causation. For Tse, we are able to generate ideas in working memory that 
are simulations of action and repercussion in order to deliberate on the solution to a problem. 
Endogenous attention allows for the manipulation of the contents in working memory, to either 
select (enhance) or deselect (attenuate) specific options. Arriving at optimized solutions we 
can then direct lower level cognitive mechanisms that will provide input to specific groups of 
neurons that will undergo synaptic reweighting to accommodate the intent of upper level mental 
events and thereby sculpt the circuits and networks of our brain into what we choose to be. What 
gives us the choice, what makes this a model for conscious free will, is the fact that these highest 
levels of cognitive processing require consciousness and phenomenology to operate.
Consciousness acts as a unifying model for decision-making, much in the same way as 
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Ramachandran considers it a homunculus for the self. Consciousness is a single framework, 
inside of which our decision-making can operate. This answers the question about why we 
have consciousness, why we have phenomenological experience, and why we experience 
qualia. These are all causal mechanisms, they are all necessary and requisite to higher level 
processing, which in turn controls future cellular responsiveness to stimuli. Qualia, Tse writes 
provide “a common, endogenously attendable format [which] is required so that the outputs 
of different subsystems can be evaluated along a common metric, by a common set of criteria 
assessing input, which, if satisfied, releases a decision to act” (10.24). In other words, in order 
for the complexity of the brain to be cohesive and efficient, all levels of processing need to 
communicate in the same language, which is what Tse proposes is the goal of qualia, or the ways 
that we experience things, like the indescribable sensation of the color red.
Higher level processing relies on ideational information in the form of representations, 
which are what we generally think of as thoughts: mental images of basketball games, mental 
simulations of our actions, the abstract concepts that are debated in a philosophy class. 
These representations, are built from the cumulative experience of qualia for in one subject, 
like the combination of sensations during a basketball game. Pivotally, the highest levels of 
processing, for Tse, require consciousness to function, thereby suggesting a role for conscious, 
phenomenal experience, in the causal mechanisms of our brain. Further, Tse notes that the 
qualia we experience aren’t simply an uncontrollable stream of processing in lower level 
unconscious mechanism; he suggests that the contents of experience “can be changed through 
the manipulations of numerous cognitive operations, such as mental rotation or volitional shifts 
of attention” (10.48).
By way of concluding the discussion of Tse’s many-sided model of free will, I will first 
allow him to tie it all together:
Certain operations can only take place over conscious operands, and thoughts and 
motor acts can follow and build upon or enact the conclusions of such operations, 
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such operations over conscious operands can be causal of subsequent thoughts 
and motor acts. Such mental operations within the domain of experience play a 
necessary (though not necessarily sufficient) causal role in their mental and motoric 
consequences and are not mere illusions of volition... It is the deliberative and 
volitional manipulation of contents of working memory via endogenous attentional 
operations that offers the primary causal role of consciousness and the primary 
domain of free will, regardless of whether or not such operations are associated 
with conscious feelings of willing or agency. Free will is not limited to the kinds 
of decisions that are reached by tracking or playing things out endogenously in 
working memory. Free will also includes the creative ability to imagine, regardless 
of whether any physical act follows from that which has been imagined (10.85).
For Tse, our self is a real and true self. Each of us is a self that is identical with the substrate 
of our brain, obeying functionalism, but that is capable of engaging in conscious, bottom up 
indeterministic thought in working memory and that uses attention as top down control over 
lower level cognitive mechanisms that instigate synaptic reweighting. This reweighting forces 
cells to respond differently to future events in a way that is mandated by conscious free will.
It is important to recall, before we leave Tse, that his example of NMDA receptors is 
just one example. There are many more receptors and non-receptor factors involved in synaptic 
reweighting. Furthermore, there is a whole field of ion channels and associated factors involved 
in nonsynaptic (intrinsic) plasticity. There are numerous mechanisms that can be involved in 
adjusting neural criterial causation, many of which have yet to be explored. Interestingly, my 
own neuroscience research in the optic tectum of Xenopus tadpoles has rendered results that 
unwittingly highlight the relevance of neural noise in encoding information, which supports 
indeterministic prerequisite activity to be acted upon by endogenous attention, and which has 
investigated the role of intrinsic plasticity in maintaining homeostatic, or sustainable, levels of 
activity in the face of long term stimulation.
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Whole brain Free Will
Tse’s discussion on the topic of free will is extensive and covers a great deal of ground. 
As such, I will be presenting Klemm as more of a supplement to Tse’s model that brings us back 
toward practical reasoning. In our discussion of Tse we have seen a thorough explanation for just 
about every component of a complete model for free will except how executive control comes 
about and what it really means at the level of deliberation, representations, and reasoning. How is 
executive control over endogenous attention and working memory functions free? It is clear how 
we can enforce a decision, and that these executive processes have a goal, and evolutionarily 
advantage, but what makes this control indeterministic at such a large scale? How do we have 
alternative possibilities from quantum uncertainty that reach all the way up to the representations 
of executive deliberation. Ultimately, the question I seek to answer with Klemm is: how do 
executive functions constitute a free willing self?
Klemm writes that “there is no doubt that humans exhibit willful considered behavior. 
We have, many people say, free will. That is, we supposedly can decide from among several 
alternatives, and this process is not directly controlled by external or internal imperatives.” 
(168) From here comes the idea of a human avatar. According to Klemm, our consciousness is 
essentially an avatar, like the characters in video games, which act as proxies for the gamer in 
the world of the game. However, Klemm writes that “the analogy of computer avatars breaks 
down when it comes to human consciousness avatars. Computer avatars cannot generate their 
own agency.” (146) He notes that “brain avatars respond to impulses and instructions from 
unconscious mind as well as ongoing environmental effects. Unlike computer avatars, however, 
the brain’s avatar may act on its own initiative to serve the best interests of the brain and the 
body” (146).
For Klemm, this avatar is nothing like a miniature person, a homunculus, inside our head 
that makes free willing decisions for us. The fallacy of the age old ‘homuncularist’ argument is 
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clear, if there is some model person inside us that regulates everything we do as a unified agent, 
then what controls that person? A smaller homunculus? For Klemm, the avatar is spread out in 
a series of representations of self that centralize internal simulations of action and thought. It is 
thought that a vital characteristic of human learning is the ability to simulate action in an internal 
model of the world, kind of like generating a virtual reality, in which we can place ourselves and 
test out different scenarios to optimize our solution to a problem.
The basis for this avatar is what Klemm calls a “CIP representation of the body” (146), 
where CIP stands for circuit impulse patterns. According to Klemm, circuit impulse patterns are 
“simultaneous activity across all neurons in a circuit at a given point in time,” which is thought 
to be able to “have some sort of combinatorial or collective code” (38). Essentially, CIP’s are 
similar to the bursting activity Tse described wherein a collective pattern of activity is capable 
of encoding more information than the mere some of its parts. As such, CIP’s are patterns of 
activity that form representations, which are a complex combination of associated inputs. For 
example, granny smith apples. You’d have neurons that represent the color of the apple (green), 
the shape (spherical), and the size (2-3 inches in diameter). Whenever you encountered an 
object with those qualities, those neurons that are sensitive to the object’s size, or shape, or color 
would be active in parallel, which would give rise to the representation of the fruit as a whole. 
Of course, our experience of the world is so much more rich than this, and our brain is equally 
and  indescribably more complex than this example leads us to believe, but the general idea, 
when we understand it, remains the same. When a current impulse flows through larger patterns 
of neurons, instead of just a couple neurons, or basic circuits, it is capable of encoding and 
representing collective information.
It is also important to note that the CIP’s do not exist in isolation, they interact with each 
other on a constant basis, recruiting additional CIP’s in order to conduct complex deliberative 
processes. Back to the apple example, when we encounter this object, we may also recruit the 
CIP representation of a tennis ball to compare how each fits the scenario. After deliberating, after 
directing endogenous attention to particular regions of the object to try to identify a stem, or the 
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braiding pattern on a tennis ball, we can come to the conclusion that this object is an apple and 
that we can eat it.
Importantly, Klemm notes that CIP’s underlie all basic brain functions “including the 
state of consciousness” (145). Thus, there is a “CIP state of consciousness,” which is a network 
of CIPs that collectively represent the self. This CIP state is “contained within the meta-circuit of 
the whole brain and is therefore integrated with what goes on in unconscious processing” (145). 
Having a CIP-level representation of self provides a reference against which all other CIPs can 
measure their activity. Tse gave us a background for how qualia act as a common language for 
the brain to generate countless representations; Klemm discusses how CIPs, the architectural/
functional explanation of these representations, refer to a complicated, but unified representation 
of self in order to be consistent and efficient.
When I speak of common languages throughout the brain, or unified representations 
of self, I am discussing the cohesiveness of the brain at the cognitive level. Often, it doesn’t 
feel like our brain is so clearly communicative; sometimes it feels backlogged, or stuck, or 
blank. Likewise, it doesn’t feel like our concept of self is so clear either; frequently we feel as 
though we aren’t sure what we like or dislike, what intentions we are driven by, or why we feel 
terribly sad when we ‘should’ be happy. There are approximately 20 billion neurons located in 
the cerebrum, the ‘thinking’ part of the brain, alone. There are thought to be five times as many 
neurons in the primal parts of our brain (the cerebellum and brainstem), and ten times as many 
glial cells as neurons; we know very little about the range of functions of glial cells, which 
puts in perspective how little knowledge we really have about the brain. Not only is there such 
a vast number, but they are organized with the efficiency and robustness of the primate family 
such that the activity of a few neurons is capable of encoding more information than other large 
brains that are less well organized, like in elephants and dolphins (Herculano-Houzel, 2009). 
My point is that, as much as examples, metaphors, and simplifications can help us to understand 
the underlying mechanisms at play, we have to remember and appreciate the fact that these 
mechanisms are being applied rapidly, very rapidly, at the scale of milliseconds, or even fractions 
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of milliseconds if we’re talking about gene transcription and protein turnover; and all of this in 
huge quantity, far beyond anything we can really imagine (despite these activities enabling our 
ability to imagine anything in the first place).
When we discuss cognitive processing in the brain, the fact that all of these activities 
can combine into the smooth, continuous and sensical movement of my fingers to type these 
words that you can understand, displays a feat of effective communication and unification that 
is beyond belief. I hesitate to compare neurons to humans, as they are very different in key 
respects, but just to try and grasp the sheer numbers, imagine if every human on earth were 
capable of communicating and executing joint actions to move a giant, planet sized being. This 
is only one third the number of neurons in the cortex, and less than a thousandth the scale of 
the number of neural and glial cells that contribute to the thought and action of a single human. 
It’s mind blowing. It only makes sense that neurons are communicating in a single language, 
and must be very unified in order for such complexity of thought and movement to be achieved. 
Thus, our brain is unified even if it doesn’t feel like it, and often times if we declutter our 
thoughts and concentrate, we can overcome moments when we blank and return to a clear sense 
of what we do and do not know. Similarly, when we meditate and deliberate sincerely, we can 
usually uncover what our thoughts and feelings are if we ever feel confused. Doing so makes us 
better and stronger people because we exercise conscious control over what our brain does, and 
sculpt ourselves into people who can overcome our obstacles.
Turning back to Klemm after that moment of reflection, I want to show how he defends 
his theory. Klemm is sure to note that “skeptics will say that these aspects of the avatar’s nature 
are preprogrammed by past experience or by genetic disposition,” which is to say that the CIP 
structure of the avatar, the anatomical structure of the neurons or the functional characteristics 
those cells have, is dictated by genetics, not by any conscious sculpting of the self. In response, 
he argues that “experiential influences are developed and learned and become explicitly 
incorporated because they are acceptable to the avatar… [and] even much of the genetic 
influence is actually epigenetic, in which a person’s choice of thought, behavior, and experiences 
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helps to control which genes get expressed” (169). Epigenetic mechanisms, in a nutshell, are 
modifications to our DNA that up or down regulate (increase or decrease) the expression of 
specific genes. These modifications, instead of being preprogrammed by our heredity, are 
accumulated, or removed, as a result of experience. Thus, our choice of what experiences to 
have exposes us to stimuli that will precipitate some or other epigenetic changes to our gene 
expression.
In his primary defense of free will, Klemm proposes that during the process of 
deliberation our conscious avatar can freely choose which considerations to take when faced 
with the problem. This process of deliberation, to Klemm, is essentially a complex network of 
CIP’s that are all interacting and recruiting new CIP’s in the process of recollecting relevant 
information in memory for a given problem. He proposes that “when decisions are performed by 
the conscious mind, the avatar can differentially select what inputs from stimuli and memory to 
consider, thus ultimately biasing one option over others. If conscious mind is an avatar, acting as 
an agent with a “mind of its own,” what is to keep it from making its own choices? This might be 
the basis for free will” (195). A mechanism for this action makes sense biologically, which is to 
say evolutionarily, because, as Klemm points out, “the capacity for conscious action means that 
humans can rise above unconsciously driven behaviors that are unwise or maladaptive” (203). 
From free willing deliberation can come imagination, critical thinking, and creative problem 
solving, all of which generate new solutions that are not limited by what is predetermined by our 
experience, our heritage, or our prejudices.
Klemm’s theory relates directly to the concept of self-generation. He brings in the 
example of crawfish who “will often move when they don’t have to… no external stimulus is 
required” (173). To explain this, he writes that “there are, however, internally generated stimuli 
that turn movement initiating systems on. Likely such movement results from random neural 
activity in the pattern generator circuit, and the option to remain in place or move to a different 
place was always there” (173). Ultimately he writes that “random things happen in nervous 
systems. They are not always inevitable,” and he suggests that these internally generated stimuli 
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“may be something as simple as inherent membrane instabilities in certain movement initiating 
neurons that make the neurons discharge impulses” (173). Tse has explained this randomized 
“instability” at a cellular level. Given that such events can happen in the nervous system we 
can see that new, or modified, neural activity can be generated without the influence of events 
external to the brain. New activity, even at the level of a single cell, can be amplified to influence 
the activity of many more neurons downstream (London et al., 2010). Thus, small changes could 
generate new CIP representations, which in their turn would introduce new representations 
to the process of deliberation. If they were selected and approved by the avatar that is our 
consciousness, then they would ultimately contribute to the representation of self.
***
Let’s compare this to practical reasoning and to my theory of self-generating motivation. 
The CIP recruitment process is essentially the neural correlate of deliberation and reasoning. 
A given set of CIP’s will represent reasons to act one way or another. During the process of 
deliberation the CIP’s are tested for how well they remain consistent to the representation of 
self, which is the equivalent of saying that during the process of deliberation our reasons are 
tested for how well they remain consistent with our identity. As we’ve seen from the work of 
Tse and Klemm, during the process of deliberation, which is the activity of executive processes 
like endogenous attention and working memory, our brain can exercise new patterns of activity. 
These new patterns are not predetermined by external influence or hardwired programs by virtue 
of indeterminism that, at the cellular level, generates novel patterns of activity. Novelty at the 
cellular level can affect the activity of the networks of which they are a part, which can generate 
or influence entire CIP representations. Given new variants, or completely new CIPs, we can 
consciously choose one by directing attention to it. When we generate this new activity we are 
generating new reasons to act a certain way.
As such, I hold that consciousness does have a causal role in the redefining of neural 
activity, and in the restructuring of network connectivity. Not only is this a position based on 
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the scientific findings I’ve described, there are many philosophers who agree with Dennett on 
many points, but not on the theory that consciousness is strictly an observation. In “Self to 
Self: Selected Essays,” J. David Velleman, who, like Dennett, holds that the self is constituted 
by a narrative, maintains that consciousness is action guiding, meaning that consciousness has 
a causal role in our decisions. As he writes, “In Dennett’s view, our error about the self is to 
assume that the protagonist of a human being’s autobiography is identical with the author” (206). 
While he holds that the “‘central controller’ of a person may indeed be a fiction…” it is still a 
conscious “reflective representation that feeds back into the person’s behavior” (214). As such, 
Velleman suggests that “subjects are ‘living out’ their self-conceptions… they are doing things 
that would accord with what they have described themselves as feeling” (215). This invokes the 
importance of our conscious construction of identity in guiding subsequent action.
When the right constellation of reasons is found to be sufficiently optimal by our 
consciousness then it genuinely moves us to act. Selecting some reason over another stabilizes 
the neural pattern that generated the relevant representations. This physically sculpts our circuits, 
in the sense of how responsive cells are, and in the sense of how they are physically connected 
to each other. As such, future activity has an updated framework in which to act. This framework 
is vital because it forces future unconscious activity to flow through patterns of cellular criteria 
and anatomy that have been created and endorsed by our consciousness such that they act as an 
extension of our conscious deliberations, like water flowing through an aqueduct.
As I’ve said before, new motivations may compel us to act in the same way that we 
would have given a different constellation of reasons. For example, we may choose not to yell 
at our friend for their sake, or we may choose not to for our sake, or for the sake of someone 
else, or some other consideration. Thus, a single action may have multiple, antecedent reasons. 
I believe it is important to distinguish between which reason compels any given action, between 
what it is that genuinely motivates us. This motivation will be entirely novel compared to the 
motivation that would have compelled an automatic decision. An automatic decision would 
have undergone approval by the avatar for reasons that have been previously established during 
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former deliberation. I might automatically choose not to yell at someone for my own sake, or, 
after some deliberation, I may still choose not to yell at someone, and I may still make that 
choice for my own sake. I hold that the automatic and the deliberative decisions are always 
different. Any choice that has undergone a process of deliberation will necessarily be novel 
because it will always have had to verify itself against new information. Thus, every time we 
are making a conscious choice, not only are we self-generating a motivation, but this motivation 
is entirely novel and is part of a larger framework of choices that make up who we are and as 
whom we identify.
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chApter 4
ImplIcAtIons In dAIly lIfe
This project has always been more to me than a purely academic debate over abstract, 
esoteric terms and conditions. This is not to say that the academic debate isn’t valuable, it is, 
and its success relies on these careful debates over key terms and conditions. But at the heart of 
this project has been a beating curiosity about daily life. I hold concepts of responsibility and 
morality to be central in our day to day interactions with people and the world around us. My 
inspiration to explore free will is inspired by my own questions about what is moral, about what 
I must take responsibility for, and what I must be responsible for doing. This is not to say that 
the academic tilt of the past three chapters is a disguise for my true interests. I believe that an 
important tool for exploring these concepts is to disentangle the vines that have grown around 
this tree and try to access the core of the issues. To do this, I believe we need to resort to very 
basic questions about causality and freedom, which we have done. In so doing we have certainly 
ripped some leaves off the branches, and while some long, tangled vines remain, we can see the 
trunk more clearly, and I believe that the path ahead is less obscured. In this chapter I’d like to 
take a step back from the rigor of academic analysis and briefly touch upon some implications of 
my proposals that will end in casual observations about our day to day activities.
Moral resPonsibility
First, how does this discussion of free will impact our morals? As I discussed very 
early on in the introduction, the fundamental question of morality depends upon responsibility, 
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or moral culpability. Moral philosophy explores what we should do. For the most part, and I 
acknowledge that there are exceptions, the question of what we should do in a given scenario 
depends on what we can be considered responsible for doing. There’s no point in holding a 
position on what we should do if we cannot be considered responsible for the relevant outcome. 
For example, it would be silly for a moral philosophy to hold that we should not sneeze in the 
presence of a respected elder. It is silly because we cannot be held responsible for sneezing, it is 
a biological function that occurs automatically and uncontrollably.
How does free will come into play here? Returning to my introduction, I noted that 
questions of responsibility are essentially questions of control. If we have control over the 
outcome of a situation, then we can be held responsible for said outcome. Taking one step lower, 
the question of control is a question of free will, in my opinion. According to my definition, 
free will is the capacity to control our cognitive mechanisms such that activity in our brains is 
not a strictly automatic process. What does it mean for “us” to control our brain? It seems to me 
that consciousness is the most frequent metric for when “we” have control over our brain, as it 
seems wrong to blame someone for something they have done without consciously supporting 
it. I therefore suggested that consciousness is the seat of the self, and in order for our self to be 
considered responsible, morally culpable, for our actions, our consciousness must be capable of 
influencing the way we deliberate and decide on a course of action.
What we have seen in the chapters leading up to this is a brief background of the 
contemporary positions on free will, a proposal for how free will could be manifest in practical 
reasoning, and several perspectives on the scientific plausibility of this proposal. I have hopefully 
convinced you that the concept of conscious control over the physical substrate of our brain is 
not divorced from reality. Based on what we currently know, we do not require magic, or radical 
paradigm shifts to substantiate how conscious processes (the “us,” the concept of self, the feeling 
of me) absolutely can exercise top down control over the lower cognitive mechanisms in our 
brain, which mediate the complex calculations required to design actions that will attend to a 
situation in the most optimal fashion. We have seen that the processes making up consciousness 
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are capable of generating new solutions to a problem in order to find an optimal solution, and 
then can change the criteria, or the rules, that lower processes in the brain follow to execute the 
relevant actions.
Returning to our moral approach to the world, the way we define and substantiate free 
will doesn’t seem to impact what activities we define as either moral or immoral; however, 
I suggest that my model for free will can help us to determine under what circumstances an 
individual’s adherence to our moral system is enough to be considered moral (or immoral), or 
if it is amoral. According to most moral philosophies an action is amoral, neither moral nor 
immoral, if it doesn’t enter the moral plane, which is to say, if it is accidental, uncontrollable, 
or unintended. This makes intuitive sense. You may be frustrated by someone who stumbles 
and drops a box on your foot, but you wouldn’t consider them immoral as it was an accident. 
Likewise, you couldn’t possibly blame a driver who has a seizure for causing an accident with 
another car as the situation was out of their control. Finally, you wouldn’t consider someone 
immoral if, when trying to comfort you, they hurt your feelings more; they were just trying to 
help. Likewise, in the opposite direction, we wouldn’t attribute good results to someone who 
caused them accidentally, unintentionally (as a result of some other action), or in circumstances 
that were out of control. This new model of free will provides a framework for recognizing 
when an action is legitimately unintentional, or uncontrollable, and when it was under the 
agent’s control. Of course, a great deal of empirical studies will need to follow up to flush out 
the mechanisms, and improve our ability to detect those mechanisms in action, but this is an 
important step in the philosophical approach.
Some philosophers have addressed the blameworthiness of psychopaths who are 
capable of deliberation and rational thought, thereby placing their actions in the plane of moral 
consideration, but who are completely blind to moral codes by no fault of their own, which 
would seem to render them outside of the moral plane (Talbert, 2008; Watson, 2013). I would 
suggest that further empirical studies subsequent to my model of free will could help establish if 
cases of psychopathy, and other mental disorders, warrant blameworthiness.
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Some moral philosophies do not require intention, consciousness, or control for an 
action to enter the moral plane. This reminds us of the relativism of morality, which lends 
strength to my argument that the perception of morality, responsibility, and personal culpability 
relies heavily on someone’s upbringing. Against Wegner and other illusionists, if we are raised 
believing that free will is an illusion, it would impact the way we conceive of morality. In a 
prime example, one study has found that belief in free will directly causes increased feelings 
of gratitude, as believing in our free will and the free will of others influences how much we 
consider acts to be sincerely motivated (Mackenzie et al., 2014).
It would be wrong of me not to also acknowledge the ways in which moral relativism 
opposes my model for free will. According to my model, free will is found in an agent that 
can be strictly understood to be an individual human. This is because I personally consider the 
individual person to be the right combination of complex processes that make up a self-sufficient 
and free willing body, and yet be small enough to represent the basic unit of free will. Many non-
eurocentric/non-Western cultures combine the concept of individual free will with the concept 
of communal free will. For example, there are traditional African philosophies, such as those 
of the Akan people in current day Ghana and Ivory Coast, where the community is considered 
the fundamental, basic unit while individuals were considered not to be self-sufficient agents. 
In contemporary African moral philosophy there is debate about whether those traditional 
values provide a moral framework that can effectively resolve contemporary conflicts, or if an 
individualistic moral philosophy more accurately defines where free will is bound, and therefore 
how to best allocate moral responsibility (Oyowe, 2013).
Community based moral systems where the individual is not considered the basic unit 
stand in odd contrast to my assumption that the individual is the seat of free will and moral 
responsibility. There is something to be said for the fact that, without a community, there is 
no concept of responsibility, punishment and reward, legal culpability, and even the reactive 
attitudes that P.F. Strawson argues are more important in the schema of moral responsibility than 
the causal background of an action (Strawson, 1962). At least, so we can expect; there aren’t 
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enough cases of people living in absolute exclusion from communities who can report their 
experiences. As my thesis does not seek to adjudicate on moral relativism vs objectivism, I will 
leave this question to someone else.
My model of free will uses the in-depth, combined perspectives of several leading 
neuroscientists (each of whose proposals stands on the shoulders of extensive scientific literature, 
so it isn’t really just the position of a few neuroscientists) to provide a substantive empirical 
background to my philosophical model. Moving forward I suggest that further empirical studies 
can pick apart the mechanisms involved in the version of free will that is roughly outlined 
here. In so doing we could establish ways to distinguish between acts that are freely willed 
and those that are not. I do not suggest that my model will discover new moral codes, (i.e. we 
won’t suddenly find out that, yes, we do have control over when we drop heavy objects), but 
rather that we might learn to distinguish between when we have control over, intention toward, 
or awareness of the outcome in a given situation, and when we don’t. This could help us to 
elucidate whether an action in some grey area does warrant consideration in the moral plane. 
For example, it is hard to say whether I should be blamed for being standoffish when it can be 
argued that my abrasive qualities are entirely unintentional and unconscious. On the one hand, 
I am not actively motivated to be standoffish, I just come off that way (in this hypothetical 
world). On the other hand, had I undergone careful deliberation, maybe I could have changed my 
conscious motivations in a way that impacted my future unconscious activity, thereby preventing 
my appearing abrasive, even when I wasn’t thinking about it. When we know more empirically 
about free will, we could better determine if I have control over my standoffishness, and should 
therefore be considered in the moral plane, or not, in which case my trespasses can slip below the 
radar as an accident.
legal rePercussions
Despite clarifying some questions of blameworthiness, the problem of how to assign 
punishment or reward on the basis of actual culpability is still thoroughly complex. As such, how 
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does this proposal change our system of law and order? In “Incognito: The Secret Lives of the 
Brain,” David Eagleman addresses the wonder of the subconscious brain as it relates to almost 
every component of our lives. In particular, Eagleman raises the question of blameworthiness for 
subconscious actions and its impact in our current legal system.
When confronted with the question of free will, Eagleman is quick to support an 
eliminitive compatibilist position much like that of Wegner. He holds that the brain strictly 
follows laws of determinism while simultaneously agreeing that such a state isn’t compatible 
with free will, thereby concluding that free will, as we think of it, does not exist beyond illusion. 
At one point, Eagleman acknowledges the argument about quantum indeterminacy, but he draws 
the conclusion that: “a system that is probabilistic and unpredictable is every bit as unsatisfying 
as a system that is deterministic, because in both cases there is no choice. It’s either coin flips 
or billiard balls but neither case equates to freedom in the sense that we’d desire to have it” 
(168). Eagleman devotes exactly a paragraph in his book to acknowledging indeterminism, and 
concludes that indeterminism cannot provide the answer. As I have shown, when we consider the 
non-probabilistic ends of indeterminism, it defies Eagleman’s terse treatment.
As we have seen, the structure of the brain as it has evolved is not only capable of 
amplifying quantum level indeterminacy but also of wielding it in a way that is not probabilistic 
after a point. This suggests that indeterminacy in the brain is neither, necessarily, superseded by 
the larger magnitudes of structure, and nor is it strictly probabilistic, or random, and therefore 
incompatible with free will. Klemm supported this view. He predicts the conclusion that 
Eagleman draws: “the doctrine of determinism states that every fact in the universe is guided 
entirely by physical law. Quantum mechanics also posits that nature is random until observed 
or measured. Neither facet provides much room for free will in human decisions. Fatalism and 
destiny governed by probabilities are corollaries” (195). However, Klemm goes on to say that 
“the equations of quantum mechanics do not predict what will happen, but rather the probability 
of what will happen.” This opposition to Eagleman-esque conclusions about quantum mechanics 
supports my theory that while starting out as quantum uncertainty, indeterminism in the brain 
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need not be entirely random. Of course, Klemm writes further that “human behavior is much 
more complex and subject to numerous variables have nothing to do with quantum mechanics. 
Free will is greatly removed from the activity of subatomic particles.” This would seem to detract 
from a theory proposing the import of quantum mechanics, but I read this to mean that quantum 
uncertainty does not govern free will, while not ruling out the fact that it is a factor.
Indeed, he does support the idea that “a more practical criterion for free will is that of 
‘could have done otherwise’” (195). A ‘could have done otherwise’ clause invokes a very similar 
argument to that of the libertarians who suggest that alternative possibilities provide a gamut of 
choices from which a free willing agent can opt for their preferred action. Recall that Klemm 
supports the idea that “when decisions are performed by the conscious mind, the avatar can 
differentially select what inputs from stimuli and memory to consider, thus ultimately biasing 
one option over others” (195). The concept of an avatar choosing what considerations to select 
when choosing from an array of options is directly comparable to my definition of free will as the 
act of self-generating a motivation wherein, during the process of deliberation, our consciousness 
defines the rules for calculating the pros and cons of each choice.
Aside from the fact that we disagree on what free will is, or can be, and whether or 
not it exists beyond illusion, I also find Eagleman’s address of blameworthiness and law to be 
incomplete. I truly admire his work, let me be clear. Incognito is a fascinating book and I agree 
with a great deal of it, almost all of it, except for the admittedly fundamental premise that free 
will is an illusion. I extend this same belief and respect to Wegner. I believe that the unconscious 
brain is a vast part of our lives, and I agree that, to a large extent, we are deterministic creatures. 
However, I disagree that all of Eagleman’s and Wegner’s evidence means there is not a larger, 
guiding capability in humans, and perhaps other animals (it’s too soon to tell), that maintains 
and is responsible for a majority of our unconscious action. Discussing Eagleman’s theories of 
blameworthiness and law will be an example of how I can agree with most of his conclusions, 
while disagreeing with the premise and finding the conclusions to be incomplete.
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After concluding that humans are strictly determined, Eagleman takes the stance that our 
thoughts, decisions, and actions are the consequence of our external influence, our biological 
makeup, and any relevant pathologies. He notes that “responsibility for your actions parallels 
volitional control,” which is to say that we would need to have free will and need to be able to 
control what choices we make if we are to be held responsible for those actions. He notes that 
free will is an open scientific question but goes on to say that “the answer to the question of free 
will doesn’t matter– At least not for the purposes of social policy…” (170). Eagleman develops 
a theory he calls the principle of sufficient automatism. He claims that, “taking into account 
the steering power of our genetics, childhood experiences, environmental toxins, hormones, 
neurotransmitters, and neural circuitry, enough of our decisions are beyond our explicit control” 
which, to him, means that “free will may exist – but if it does it has very little room in which to 
operate… the principal states that the answer to the free-will question simply does not matter” 
(170). Reasserting Klemm’s objection that most genetic expression is epigenetic, and therefore 
modified by experiences we choose, and Tse’s argument that automatic neural mechanisms 
can be criterially adjusted by consciousness, much of what Eagleman claims is beyond explicit 
control is actually well within the control of a free willing agent.
The question of what is possible without consciousness is an old one. A classic 
formulation for calling into question the essential nature of conscious intervention in decision-
making is the zombie argument. Imagine a creature, the zombie, with every capacity of a normal 
human except conscious experience. The claim of the zombie problem is that we could imagine 
such a thing, that conscious experience is a non-causal component of us that can be removed 
from the equation without disturbing functionality. For Tse, the question doesn’t work. Either 
humans and zombies are completely different, or they are exactly the same down to sharing 
conscious experience. The two would be different because we’ve removed “‘precompiled’ 
information that endogenous attentional and planning circuitry can access and operate on,” 
which makes it so that the zombies would have “nothing to manipulate in working memory for 
purposes of planning or internal visualization” (10.83). It could be argued that zombies ‘could’ 
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be built with the ability to direct attention, but that the attention would not be manipulating 
consciously experienced qualia. Tse objects that this is impossible, the point of endogenous 
attention is that it manipulates consciously experienced qualia. There is no “endogenously 
‘inaccessible qualia’” (10.83) that can be removed to make this hypothetical zombie. Thus, we 
cannot debunk the importance of consciousness in decision making using the zombie problem 
because its presuppositions are incoherent. There is evidence for the fact that endogenous 
attention is required to perform some tasks in the efficient way that we free willing agents do 
(Lee, 1999; Carrasco, 2004; Lu, 2004; Chong, 2005; and Busse, 2008, to name only a few 
examples).
Back to Eagleman, he asserts that assigning blame and our legal system is currently 
based on what biological factors we are capable of detecting with our technology. The natural 
conclusion would be, as Eagleman acknowledges, that, “the bottom line of the argument is 
that a criminal should always be treated as incapable of having acted otherwise. The criminal 
activity itself should be taken as evidence of brain abnormality, regardless of whether currently 
measurable problems can be pinpointed” (177). As such, Eagleman argues that blame for a crime 
or legal culpability, “appears to be the wrong question to ask. Here’s the right question: what 
do we do, moving forward, with an accused criminal?” While I disagree with the premise that 
blameworthiness, moral responsibility, or legal culpability, is irrelevant because we do not have 
free will, I agree with the conclusion that the criminal justice system should focus more on what 
to do with criminals moving forward rather than to throwing them in jail without first trying to 
help them. As he writes, “a forward thinking legal system will parlay biological understanding 
into customized rehabilitation…” (180). Agreeing with Eagleman on this point is easy enough. 
Of course, I believe in mercy, compassion, understanding, and rehabilitation as opposed to the 
indubitably unfair and cruel criminal justice system in place. I also agree with what he proposes 
we can do to address this question of what to do moving forward.
Eagleman proposes that “to help a citizen reintegrate into society, the ethical goal is to 
change him as little as possible to allow his behavior to come into line with society’s needs” 
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(182). The goal is to change the criminal as little as possible in order to avoid the frightening 
conclusion of science fiction novels such as Clockwork Orange, and 1984. He goes on to say 
that this can be done by focusing on impulse control. As he writes, “poor impulse control is 
a hallmark characteristic of the majority of criminals in the prison system” (182). Thus he 
concludes that the best rehabilitative strategy for criminals is “to give the frontal lobes [involved 
in long term planning] practice in squelching the short-term [impulse driven] circuits” (183). 
Our impulses, like the desire for chocolate, money, snacks, alcohol, television, or sex, are kept 
at bay by our frontal lobes, which suppress this short term activity when keeping in mind larger 
concepts like social acceptability, discipline, and future plans. Most of us have a temptation that 
overwhelms the frontal lobes ability to suppress it, but normally acting on these temptations does 
not invoke legal ramifications. For those of us with especially poor impulse control, Eagleman 
suggests that these can make for criminal activity and can be corrected through customized 
impulse control activities, which he describes in more detail in his book. The long and short of 
it is that I agree with his proposals as a system for rehabilitation, and as an alternative to the 
counterproductive criminal justice system we currently have in place.
The mistake, or the missing piece to a complete solution, is the lack of attention to 
the concept of responsibility. At the level of the application of law, personal concepts of 
responsibility are irrelevant. The law will determine culpability according to its predefined 
principles. However, moral decision making comes into play in situations that are not resolved 
by “blind” justice. One example is that of rehabilitation. The goal is to bring the person to a place 
where they can better understand what their responsibilities to society are, and how they can 
exercise more control over their actions in order to fulfill their duties. In this case, I believe that 
it would be unhealthy, and counterproductive, in addition to inaccurate, to instill the belief that 
conscious control is an illusion and that our actions are ultimately uncontrollable by anything but 
the automatic, hardwired components of our brain.
Rehabilitation need not only be a cure for criminal behavior, in “The Brain That 
Changes Itself,” psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Norman Doidge discusses cases of patients 
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with mental disorders and damage from trauma who have been successfully cured by a variety 
of techniques aimed at ‘rewiring’ the brain. As he writes extensively, it is becoming clear in 
contemporary neuroscience that the analogy of the brain as machine has the fundamental flaw 
of underestimating neuroplasticity, the inherent malleability of neural connections in our brain. 
Of particular relation to the topic of free will and consciousness, he even demonstrates how 
imagination and mental practice can optimize the connectivity in our brain in order to perform 
specific tasks. In essence, he is describing the ability of our conscious mental mechanisms, 
such as Klemm’s CIPs or Tse’s endogenous attention and working memory, to sculpt neural 
pathways. These changes to the brain would not only influence those actions mandated by our 
consciousness, they would also influence the unconscious processing of information, which 
would be forced to proceed through the sculpted framework.
Personal identity
Other examples can be found in daily life. This brings me to my final comments on 
free will. Given current neuroscience, I believe that we need not rely on Wegner’s concept of 
morality and responsibility, but can instead turn to the theories of practical philosophers such 
as Korsgaard. Recall from Chapter 1 that, to Wegner, the strength of our illusion is enough to 
maintain the phenomenology of free will, which in turn maintains moralistic behavior.
As I have said when previously discussing Wegner, beyond my contention that free will 
isn’t an illusion, I hold that the intentional stance would not be infallible to the belief that free 
will is an illusion. As such, there’s no point in drawing such an influential conclusion when the 
evidence doesn’t exist. Wegner makes a strong case for the role of unconscious action through 
his use of examples from pathologies. I willingly concede that consciousness is not necessary 
for action. However, the arguments I have presented on the causal role of consciousness do 
not require that decision-making and action be contingent on conscious intervention. What 
Ramachandran, Tse, and Klemm suggest is that consciousness optimizes the process of decision-
making in order to drive action that is consistent to a single self-identity. Upholding a concept 
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of self-identity through conscious influence on decision-making has ultimately led to the 
optimization of interspecies interactions, which have enabled the construction of cooperative 
efforts, societies, and, at this point, the miraculously interconnected global community.
The fault in Wegner’s argument is in understating what he calls phenomenal free will. 
Instead, Wegner pushes to the fore the strength of the role of unconscious decision-making. 
Ultimately, it has been shown that phenomenological qualities of consciousness can sculpt 
the way our automatic cognitive mechanisms function in a way that essentially makes our 
unconscious decisions an extension of our conscious decisions. Wegner concedes that an 
ontological free will exists wherein higher level conscious mechanisms influence those lower 
down, but he maintains that phenomenology cannot have a causal role based on Libet’s studies 
finding that the experience of will comes after the brain decides on an action.
I have shown that contemporary neuroscience since Wegner supports the role of 
phenomenology in free will. Phenomenology provides the context for the concept of self. Our 
phenomenological selves experience qualia that are precompiled by our brain, as Tse suggests, 
and can consciously direct attention to some or other qualia. Directing attention ultimately 
shapes which qualia are processed with greater priority. This cognitive explanation parallels the 
practical reasoning explanation wherein reason is a process of deliberation to select the optimal 
considerations, or motivations, to hold during decision-making.
To Wegner’s credit, I find that his reference to the import of authorship is entirely 
accurate, and distinctly similar to the way that philosophers of practical reasoning describe 
morality and reason. Through a lens of practical reasoning we can, lastly, look into how 
this thesis on free will can impact our day to day activities. Practical reasoning provides an 
explanation of how the deliberative quality of free will enables the sensation of authorship, and 
how that motivates moral action. Practical reasoning operates under the assumption that the 
human capacity of reason constitutes free will, which, given the contents of previous chapters, 
need no longer be an assumption or an illusion. Reason, which is defined in practical reasoning 
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as the capacity to reflect and deliberate, is essentially the process of our endogenous attention 
manipulating lower cognitive functions, favoring some patterns of neuronal activity over others, 
in order to change the criteria or rules for future neuronal activity.
Recall Korsgaard’s key quote on practical reasoning and moral decision making: “the 
reflective structure of human consciousness requires that you identify yourself with some law 
or principle, which will govern your choices. It requires you to be a law to yourself. And that is 
the source of normativity” (103-104). This suggests that the way we identify ourselves is vitally 
important in our day to day activities, which is why I turn back to this in my final notes on the 
impact of free will. It is important that we uphold an identity that respects personal culpability 
instead of taking the easy way out and blaming nature and hardwiring. As science enables 
us to explain behavior in greater and greater detail, there can be a tendency to translate those 
results into excuses for our own behavior. For example, we sometimes excuse stubbornness or 
a tendency to yell when we’re upset on the way we were raised, stress, too much coffee, or too 
little coffee. Sometimes we disregard some unconscious social error like invading someone’s 
personal space, or repeatedly saying something demeaning by appealing to obliviousness.
Of course, there are times when appealing to a lack of control is perfectly legitimate. 
Something as profound as childhood abuse, for example, can have very powerful lasting effects 
that are out of the control of the agent. When I say that we need to maintain an identity that 
appreciates our personal culpability, I am not suggesting that we all have to assume a radically 
individualistic nature where we consider ourselves responsible for every minuscule action we 
perform. Ultimately, I want to caution us against over-exaggerating those circumstances we do 
not have control over. Blaming standoffish behavior on stress or upbringing is a cop out, and 
it undermines what truth there might be in such a statement for someone exposed to constant 
domestic abuse, who might have a far more compelling reason to be blameless for such behavior.
A final contribution from practical reasoning are the concepts of natural goodness and 
deep happiness (Foot, 2001). The natural good for humans is based on the fact that we are 
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reflective, rational beings in the same way that Korsgaard described. We are naturally compelled 
to do as best fits our natural goodness, which means doing what we feel is best for us. This is 
not to say that all action is motivated toward furthering the self, but rather the general human 
good, which Foot argues is what we are all compelled toward in order to achieve deep happiness. 
Deep happiness goes beyond the superficial happiness we might obtain from selfish actions; it is 
experienced by one who can “not only see his or her good as bound up with goodness of desire 
and action, but also feel that it is, with sentiments such as pleasure, pride and honor” (98). Our 
reflective capacity discourages immoral behavior by denying us access to this deep happiness, 
which is experienced about objects “that are basic in human life, such as home, and family, and 
work, and friendship” which can all yield a “shared reaction among human beings to things that 
are very general in human life” (88). Anyone motivated toward selfish ends will be plagued by 
self-inflicted guilt and the inability to trust others, which prevents any feeling of deep happiness. 
As rational agents, we apply practical reasoning and are motivated to act by reasons that we 
can weigh as more or less important to us. Since we are capable of seeing grounds to perform a 
variety of actions, we choose one based on what I call our self-generated motivations. Our choice 
of motivation is what is subject to moral scrutiny.
Knowing the power that conscious will can have over molding plastic activities in the 
brain empowers us to improve ourselves. Through careful deliberation we can sculpt our moral 
engagement with other people and the world at large. By consciously acknowledging the needs 
and desires of others in conjunction with ourselves, and by identifying human goodness through 
deliberation, we can self-generate motivation to pursue that goodness. For the most part we do 
not skirt responsibility for our actions. Many people will excuse themselves in front of others and 
suffer guilt alone. I do not find the experience of culpability to be in immediate danger. However, 
I do believe that commitment to an identity that promotes human goodness through careful 
deliberation, and the recognition of our power over our actions will make us better co-workers, 
friends, lovers, and participants in the global human good.
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